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Energy security has become a key watchword in defining the contemporary security 
landscape. Although the 1973 Oil Crisis is likely the most significant energy dispute in 
modern history, energy conflicts continue to impact nations and citizens around the 
world. Several energy disputes with Russia in the first decade of the twenty-first century 
serve as poignant examples of contemporary energy insecurity. The 2006 Russia-Ukraine 
gas disagreement halted the delivery of 100 million cubic meters of gas to Europe; in 
2007, the Russian-Belarus energy clash direly affected Germany’s economy. 
Subsequently, Ukraine siphoned gas from its pipeline to Europe in an attempt to hold 
European households hostage during a row with Russia over gas prices in 2009. 
However, unconventional natural gas innovations, such as shale gas and Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG), are dynamically altering the energy security relationships between 
Russia, the former Soviet republics, and Europe. This thesis will utilize a comparative 
study of the contemporary natural gas pipeline market and current unconventional gas 
market to analyze the ramifications both markets have on European and Eurasian energy 
security, future prospects for expansions, and possible sources of contention within both 
frameworks, which will lead to an examination of future energy security policy 
implications. 
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Energy security has become a key watchword in defining the contemporary 
security landscape. Although the 1973 Oil Crisis is likely the most significant energy 
dispute in modern history, energy conflicts continue to impact nations and citizens 
around the world. For example, Nigerian rebels set fire to their country’s oil pipeline in 
2005 and attacked the Lagos oil import terminal in 2009; Somali pirates hijacked a Saudi 
oil tanker in February 2011; North Sudan halted oil shipments from South Sudan in a 
2011 dispute over customs fees; and South Sudan recently responded in April 2012 by 
seizing an oil field in North Sudan. The January 2013 terrorist raid and international 
hostage crisis at Algeria’s Amanas natural gas facility provides a poignant illustration of 
the fragility of energy security. Moreover, Iran’s threats to mine the Strait of Hormuz are 
troubling indicators of potential shocks to the international oil market. The Eurasian gas 
market is also rife with political instability. Several energy disputes with Russia in the 
first decade of the 21st Century serve as poignant examples of European/Eurasian energy 
insecurity. The 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas disagreement halted the delivery of 100 million 
cubic meters of gas to Europe; in 2007, the Russian-Belarus energy clash direly affected 
Germany’s economy. Subsequently, Ukraine siphoned gas from its pipeline to Europe in 
an attempt to hold European households hostage during a row with Russia over gas prices 
in 2009. In Central Asia, a 2009 pipeline explosion sparked a 2010 Russo-Turkmen gas 
war, which Ashgabat survived with loans from China.1  Thus, fear of energy blackmail 
and terrorist attacks on infrastructure permeate current defense analysis. However, 
unconventional natural gas innovations, such as shale gas and Liquefied Natural Gas, are 
dynamically altering the energy security relationships between Russia, the former Soviet 
republics, and Europe. Most significantly, Liquefied Natural Gas has enabled Europe to 
                                                 
1 “Algeria’s hostage crisis: A murky mess,” Economist, January 18, 2013, accessed January 18, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/01/algerias-hostage-crisis; Bendik Solum Whist, Nord 
Stream: Not Just a Pipeline, FNI Report 15 (Fridtjof Nanses Institut, 2008), 14, accessed January 25, 2012, 
http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf.FNI-R1508.pdf; Marcin Kaczmarski, “Domestic Sources of Russia’s China 
Policy,” Problems of Post-Soviet Communism 59, no. 2 (April 2012), 7; Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ed., 
Energy Security Challenges for the 21
st
 Century: A Reference Handbook (Washington, D.C.: Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 2009), ix.  
 2 
blunt Moscow’s energy blackmail attacks by diminishing Russia’s market share of 
European energy imports—bolstering European energy security. 
A. IMPORTANCE  
A myriad of national defense white papers and security strategies highlight energy 
security as a priority area to include Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 
Norway, Poland, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (U.S.) among 
many others. While most security strategies emphasize regional stability in energy 
suppliers’ neighborhoods and physical infrastructure security, Poland’s white paper cites 
Russia’s energy policy as a direct risk to Polish national security: “The Russian 
Federation, taking advantage of the rising energy prices, has been attempting intensively 
to reinforce its position on a supraregional level.”2 Additionally, multilateral 
organizations and defense alliances have made commitments to protect energy 
infrastructure or promote energy security including the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).3  Although the placement of energy security under 
the purview of military alliances may be unsettling, most countries employ market 
principles and infrastructure diversification to counter energy risks.   
Russia and several European nations have responded to mounting energy 
instabilities by developing gas pipelines from Russia directly to Central Europe. 
Although multiple energy disputes with transit states would seem like a boon for the 
Nord Stream and South Stream projects, current political sentiment in Belarus, the Baltic 
States, Poland, Scandinavia, Ukraine, and European policy centers appear 
                                                 
2 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: 2007), 6, accessed August 10, 2012, 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Poland-2007-eng.pdf. 
3 Félix Arteaga, “Energy Security in Central Asia: Infrastructure and Risk,” Madrid: Real Instituto 
Elcano, 2010, accessed July 31, 2012, 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcan
o/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI1–2010; Günther Oettinger, “Energy Security for Europe: The EU Agenda until 
2050,” February 10, 2011,  EUROPA - Press Releases, accessed August 2, 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/98&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guilanguage=en.   
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overwhelmingly opposed to routes that bypass Eastern Europe. Thus, German and Italian 
investment in the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines, respectively, may have been 
purchased at great economic and political cost. First, several analysts argue these energy 
projects will consolidate Russia’s control over Europe’s supply.4  Second, unilateral 
energy pacts hobble the EU’s ability to coherently negotiate with Russia.5  Furthermore, 
Europe’s future energy security will likely rely on exports from the Caspian Basin—
namely, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Therefore, strengthening the energy 
bridge from Central Asia and the South Caucasus region to Europe is a strategic 
imperative for the EU. Yet, this energy network may be imperiled by unreliable access to 
energy sources and aggressive Russian energy diplomacy. During President Vladimir 
Putin’s July 9, 2012, address to Russia’s ambassadors, he touted economic power as the 
source of Russia’s strength and affirmed that economic integration in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) is Russia’s core strategic objective.6  Thus, it appears that 
Russia seeks to control the energy bridge from Central Asia to Europe to shore-up its 
influence in CIS nations, former Soviet republics, and Europe itself. However, dynamic 
natural gas technologies have altered the energy environment—relegating geographic 
dependence on neighboring states for energy transit or sales. 
Unconventional gas innovation—shale gas and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)—
has been transforming the energy landscape for the last decade. Less than ten years ago, 
shale gas comprised two percent of U.S. domestic output, but currently makes up a third 
of U.S. gas production. Additionally, the U.S. National Petroleum Council asserts that the 
United States alone holds shale gas deposits to provide approximately a century of energy 
                                                 
4 Alexander Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,” Letort Paper, Strategic 
Studies Institute-U.S. Army War College, October 2011, 127; Robert L. Larsson, Nord Stream, Sweden and 
Baltic Sea Security (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2007), 7,accessed July 30, 2012, 
http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2251.pdf; Ariel Cohen, “Russia: The flawed Energy Superpower,” in Energy 
Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook, ed., Gal Luft and Anne Korin 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 2009), 94; Jeffrey Mankoff, 
“Eurasian Energy Security,” Council Special Report (Council on Foreign Relations), no. 43 (February 
2009); accessed July 31, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/eurasian-energy-security/p18418, 14 & 27. 
5 Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe: An Overview of 
Existing and Planned Infrastructures (Paris: IFRI, 2011), 71; Ariel Cohen, “Russia: The flawed Energy 
Superpower,” 94. 
6 Vladimir Putin, “Russia in a Changing World: Stable Priorities and New Opportunities,” July 9, 
2012, Kremlin-Press Release, accessed July 25, 2012, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4145. 
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at current U.S. consumption rates.7  In the past decade, the United States has stopped 
importing natural gas, and LNG shipments previously bound for the U.S. market have 
been redirected to Europe. Furthermore, the United States is likely to become a gas 
exporter in the next decade. Europe has been diversifying energy sources by building 
LNG terminals to receive increased shipments from Africa and the Middle East. The EU-
27 estimates that its LNG consumption will increase from 8.9 percent of its energy mix to 
31.8 by 2030. Because Russian does not ship LNG to Europe, LNG may significantly 
reduce EU reliance on Russian gas. There is also evidence of substantial shale gas 
availability in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland, which will shift the sources 
of gas-flows within Europe. If environmental concerns caused by shale gas production 
can be addressed, this new gas source could increase EU domestic energy production—
further decreasing the share of Russian gas in Europe’s energy mix.8  Therefore, the 
developments of shale gas and LNG could create a new energy paradigm where 
geography does not dictate energy relationships or geopolitical energy influence. These 
innovations have the potential to weaken Russia’s monopoly on natural gas in the region 
by offering Middle Eastern or African LNG alternatives to Russian gas, and European 
shale gas deposits provide the opportunity for the European Union to produce a portion of 
its own energy further reducing dependence on Gazprom and the Kremlin.     
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although shale gas and LNG technologies are transforming the natural gas 
industry, Eurasian energy security policies may not significantly adjust unless these 
technological advances address fundamental energy security threats. Thus, to effectively 
examine the results of unconventional gas production, the sources of energy insecurity 
must be explored. A predominant theme emerged as many analysts attribute insecurity in 
European and Eurasian energy sectors to Russia’s aggressive pipeline diplomacy. There 
                                                 
7  Frank A. Verrastro, “The Role of Unconventional Oil and Gas: A New Paradigm for Energy,” in 
2012 Global Forecast: Risk, Opportunity, and the Next Administration, ed. Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 66–67. 
8 Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe, 57–58; Baker 
Institute for Public Policy,  “Shale Gas and U.S. National Security,” Baker Institute Policy Report, No.  49 
(October 2011), 1 & 7.   
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is striking evidence that Russia flexes its energy muscles to coerce other nations. 
Alexander Ghaleb of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College affirms 
that Moscow has used gas disruptions and price disputes or threatened to impose these 
sanctions over forty times since the collapse of the Soviet Union.9   In the reference 
handbook, Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century, Ariel Cohen, Senior 
Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the 
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, agrees that Russia 
has already demonstrated its ability to drastically increase energy prices as a tool to 
implement its foreign policy. He further argues that the Kremlin believes customer 
governments will not challenge Russia’s aggressive energy diplomacy.10   According to 
Jeffrey Mankoff, Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale University, 
the 2009 Ukraine gas dispute showed that Russia has shown its ability to forgo short-term 
economic gain to secure long-term diplomatic dominance.11  Ghaleb further purports that 
Russia will use natural gas disruptions or price disputes to influence NATO decision 
making in the future and affect the geostrategic policy of the United States and its NATO 
allies.12  
Apart from energy disputes, several observers fear Russia will use its energy 
infrastructure as a means to rationalize military intervention in other states. Robert 
Larsson, a security policy analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, affirms in 
his assessment on the Nord Stream pipeline that the Baltic and Scandinavian states fear 
Russian military presence in their territorial waters under the guise of military protection 
of Russia’s strategic energy investment—namely the Nord Stream pipeline.13  According 
to some analysts, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War is a powerful example of the confluence 
between energy interests and military power. While most analysts argue that Moscow’s 
energy dominance played a key role in EU inaction during the 2008 Georgia invasion, 
                                                 
9 Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,” 127. 
10 Ariel Cohen, “Russia: The flawed Energy Superpower,” 92–93. 
11 Mankoff, “Eurasian Energy Security,” 14. 
12 Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,” 127. 
13 Robert L. Larsson, Nord Stream, Sweden and Baltic Sea Security, 7. 
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Cohen points out that “controlling strategic energy corridors from the Caspian Sea to the 
Black Sea and beyond” was a key impetus for the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. This 
conflict not only allowed Russia to maintain physical control of key transit pipelines from 
Central Asia, but ensured that the west viewed the Caspian region as too unstable a 
market to continue energy infrastructure investment to bypass Russia.14   Mankoff agrees 
Russia’s military action “has only reinforced Russian dominance in the energy sphere, 
raising the stakes for countries in the region that would seek to escape its grip.”15   
The aforementioned scholars and analysts believe the expansion of the Nord 
Stream and South Stream energy pipelines, which bypass the Baltic states, Poland, and 
Ukraine, will give Russia even greater power in Eastern Europe, which receives 80 
percent of its energy from Gazprom, while the Baltic States, Finland, and Slovakia are 
100 percent dependent on Russian energy. Nord Stream and South Stream create gas 
route to the heart of Europe that allow Russia to turn off energy to Belarus, Poland, and 
Ukraine without affecting its most important customers in Europe—namely Germany and 
Italy. Furthermore, these pipelines will link nations to Gazprom sources that have yet to 
depend on Russian energy, like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. As EU 
dependence on imported gas is projected to grow to over 80 percent and production in the 
North Sea is anticipated to decrease by 40 percent before 2020, the EU and NATO may 
also become victims of energy blackmail.16   
In addition to geostrategic consequences of Russia’s aggressive energy 
diplomacy, many analysts are concerned with the market ramifications of the Kremlin’s 
control of Russian energy companies. Kevin C. Smith, a senior associate at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, argues that Gazprom’s status as a domestic monopoly 
may limit foreign companies’ ability to negotiate prices or quantities with the 
government-backed giant. Russia’s use of intermediary companies and pipeline 
consortium registrations in Switzerland also prevents European governments from 
                                                 
14 Cohen, “Russia: The flawed Energy Superpower,” 92. 
15 Mankoff, “Eurasian Energy Security,” 7. 
16 Robert L. Larsson, Nord Stream, Sweden and Baltic Sea Security, 7; Cohen, “Russia: The flawed 
Energy Superpower,” 94; Ghaleb, “Natrual Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,” 127; Mankoff, 
“Eurasian Energy Security,” 14 & 27. 
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gaining insight into the consortium’s activities. Therefore, Russia may control 
downstream actions of European companies and influence other states via its major stake 
in pipeline consortium.17  When assessing the South Stream versus Nabucco pipeline 
investment opportunities, Rafael Fernández from the Department of Applied Economics 
of the Complutense University of Madrid observed, Russia consistently maintains fifty-
one percent stake or more in international consortiums to control these projects.18   
Moscow has also used consortiums and long term energy agreements to retain control of 
export markets from Central Asia and the Caspian Basin, while blocking infrastructure 
investment that would weaken Russia’s monopoly of the Eurasian energy bridge. In 
addition to establishing multinational consortiums, Moscow consistently seeks to increase 
its investment in European energy infrastructure, like pipelines, refineries, electric grids, 
and port terminals to gain influence in downstream market activities, and possibly serve 
as tools of Russia’s foreign policy.19  
Although Russia has been an unscrupulous energy provider, European and 
Eurasian energy insecurity is not rooted in aggressive pipeline diplomacy, but the 
concentration of energy suppliers in the region.20  Daniel Yergin, founder of Cambridge 
Energy Research Associates and CNBC’s Global Energy Expert, views energy in a 
global context and differentiates energy security from the perspective of supplier and 
consumer. Russia, as an energy exporter, desires “security of demand” for its exports and 
control of strategic resources, including majority stakes in downstream infrastructure. 
This analysis follows Smith’s assessment of Russia’s aggressive energy investment 
choices, but casts these decisions in the light of rational action for the energy supplier. 
Yet, most of the developed world is a consumer of energy and seeks adequate supplies at 
                                                 
17 Keith C. Smith, “Lack of Transparency in Russian Energy Trade,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 4 & 15, accessed July 31, 2012, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/100702_Smith_LackOfTransparency_Web.pdf.  
18 Rafael Fernández, “The EU and Natural Gas from Central Asia: Is Nabucco the Best Option?”  
(Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2010), 7, accessed July 31, 2012, 
http://www.realinstituotelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano
/elcano_in/zonas_in/asia-pacific/ari102–2009.  
19 Ibid., Mankoff, “Eurasian Energy Security,” 16. 
20 Theodore Moran, “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of 
Foreign Dependence,” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990), 80. 
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reasonable prices, which runs counter to Russia’s aims. Thus, the European energy 
debate focuses on how to foster stability whilst dependent on imported natural gas.21 
Furthermore, Yergin affirms that high energy prices and energy insecurity are the result 
of global supply and demand, but often exacerbated by exporter’s domestic policies or 
monopolistic control of the energy industry. Simply put, the key to energy security is 
diversification.22  While attesting that Russia will use natural gas to influence NATO 
decision making, Ghaleb confirms that market forces empower Moscow: “Russia’s 
monopoly of the gas supply to Eastern Europe allows it to impose unilateral sanctions at 
will, without the fear that the target will attempt to get gas from other European 
states…because the other European states also get much of their gas from Russia.”23   
Thus, Russia’s aggressive energy diplomacy is fueled by lack of diversified energy 
resources or transit routes in Europe and Eurasia. In his examination of the feasibility of 
the Nabucco project, Rafael Fernández provided troubling statistics concerning Europe’s 
energy dependence. As of 2009, dependence on Russian energy in Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Slovakia was absolute as these nations received 100 percent of their 
natural gas from Russia. Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, and Hungary purchased 75 
percent of their energy from Gazprom, while Poland, Romania, and Slovenia were 
dependent on Russia for over 50 percent of their energy-mix. Furthermore, the EU-27 
imported 43 percent of its natural gas from Russia.24   
Some analysts believe that the global demand for gas will continue to increase, 
which will place Europe in a more dire position due to greater competitions for natural 
gas. Ghaleb purports, “unless new alternative energy sources emerge, natural gas will 
surpass oil by the year 2050, and will grow to become the fuel of the future.”25   Dr. 
Michael Klare, U.S. defense policy and oil analyst, forecasts in Energy Security 
Challenges for the 21st Century the gap between energy demand for oil and gas greatly 
                                                 
21 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (Mar 2006): 71–72. 
22 Ibid., 70, 73–74. 
23 Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,” 6. 
24 Rafael Fernandez, ““The EU and Natural Gas from Central Asia: Is Nabucco the Best Option?,” 1. 
25 Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,” 6. 
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outstripping supply, and will surely increase the risk of great power conflicts over energy 
resources. He further argues that Russia is not the nation most likely to use military force 
to protect its energy assets: “It is the United States that, until now, has devoted most 
effort to the protection of foreign oil-producing regimes and that has most vigorously 
employed military force to ensure safe access to overseas sources of energy.”26  
Moreover, he affirms that China has used the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
and joint military training to provide military assistance to its energy partners in Central 
Asia; thus, military confrontation between the United States and China over energy 
resources is an emerging reality.27  Yet, energy shortages may not necessarily result in 
open military conflict. Despite tensions during the 1973 oil crisis, military force was not 
used to normalize the oil market.   
Furthermore, Daniel Yergin examined historical responses to peak oil periods in 
“Ensuring Energy Security” and determined: “despite the current pessimism, higher oil 
prices will do what higher prices usually do: fuel growth in new supplies by significantly 
increasing investment and by turning marginal opportunities into commercial 
prospects.”28  In other words, energy shortages in the future will likely produce 
investment in alternative energy fields or projects that may not have been economical 
when energy prices were lower. Yergin also maintains that increased capacity in the oil 
market will come from “nontraditional supplies” such as oil sands or ultra-deep water 
deposits, which are both a reality through continual advances in technology. In addition 
to unconventional extraction, conventional supplies have increased in the past, such as 
the Caspian oil pipeline or U.S. offshore oil extraction.29  After analyzing the global oil 
market, Yergin provides three principles for energy security. First, diversification of 
supply is the key to energy security. If one provider disrupts supply, then other suppliers 
can provide an alternative, which supports consumers’ and producers’ desires for a stable 
                                                 
26 Michael T. Klare, “There Will Be Blood: Political Violence, Regional Warfare, and the Risk of 
Great-Power Conflict over Contested Energy Sources,” in Energy Security Challenges for the 21st 
Century: A Reference Handbook, ed., Gal Luft and Anne Korin (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress 
Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 2009), 59.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” 6.  
29 Ibid. 
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market. Second, consumers should seek a “buffer” in the supply system to serve against 
shocks, which can include storage facilities, strategic reserves, or spare production 
capacity. Lastly, states must recognize the “reality of integration.”  According to Yergin, 
“There is only one oil market, a complex and worldwide system that moves and 
consumes about 86 million barrels of oil every day…Secession is not an option.”30  
Although Yergin examines the global oil market, his principles are also applicable 
to the gas market. Currently, European and Eurasian energy providers hold a monopoly 
on sources or export routes; however, Yergin’s assessment of nontraditional supply 
exploration in oil markets holds true for natural gas as well. Shale gas production in the 
United States and the growth of LNG exporters in Africa and the Middle East have 
already positively affected Europe’s energy market and decreased reliance on Russian 
gas. With substantial shale gas deposits in several European states, including Poland, 
Europe could further decrease dependence on imported gas, and developing LNG 
terminals and resilient infrastructure buffers would further improve Europe’s energy 
security. Yet, increasing Europe’s energy independence could have ramifications in 
Central Asia as well. If Europe begins investing in alternatives to pipeline gas, the 
Nabucco project is in peril of being abandoned, which could solidify Russia’s economic 
dominance in the Caspian Basin and Central Asian Republics. Incidentally, 
unconventional gas exploration and shipment has the potential to globalize the natural gas 
market—aligning Yergin’s security principles with natural gas production. Still, several 
significant hurdles to nontraditional natural gas exploration remain (discussed below), 
which could certainly inhibit the development of a global gas market and empower 
Russia to maintain its dominant control of the Eurasian energy bridge. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
If the international oil market restricts the ability of individual actors from 
significantly leveraging energy assets to coerce other states, then a growing international 
gas market would be welcome news in Europe, but may have diverging effects in Central 
Asia or the Caspian Region. To fully examine the effects of unconventional shale gas 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 7. 
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exploration, the status of the international gas market must first be assessed. Is there an 
emerging international marketplace and how will an international gas market to truly 
change the levers of energy power in Europe and Eurasia?  Yet, before answering these 
questions, the critical hurdles to shale gas and LNG development must be addressed. 
Currently, the most significant short-term inhibitor to development is the environmental 
repercussions of shale gas extraction by pumping water, sand and chemicals into rock 
formations at high pressure. This technique is known as hydraulic fracturing or 
“fracking” and poses possible environmental risks, including poisoning groundwater and 
increased greenhouse gas emissions over traditional gas extraction. As a result, France 
has banned shale gas drilling and Chevron ceased extraction in Bulgaria and Romania 
due to environmental protests. Thus, one focus in this thesis will be the most recent 
environmental assessment of shale gas and its impact on the extraction of international 
shale gas resources. Based on the EU’s clean energy goals and value of renewable 
energy, it seems unlikely that most European countries will harvest shale gas deposits. 
Still, Eastern European states, like Poland, may override the EU’s environmental norms 
in support of increased energy security.   
In addition to environmental concerns, economic shortfalls may inhibit shale gas 
and LNG investment.   In order to increase production of shale gas and LNG shipping, 
European companies or governments will be required to spend a large amount building 
LNG infrastructure or shale gas extraction technologies. While consortiums with western 
companies are sure to limit the monetary burden of new infrastructure, investments in 
unconventional natural gas will likely divert funds from renewable energies or competing 
gas infrastructure projects—namely the Nabucco pipeline from Central Asia. Therefore, 
this study will also examine economic determinants to infrastructure development. 
Yet, the greatest obstacle to unconventional gas exploration is not economical or 
environmental, but political. Government decision-making will likely play the greatest 
role in determining the emergence of an international gas market. This realization leads to 
the final issue this thesis will investigate, what are the domestic and foreign policy 
implications for European/Eurasian energy investment?  Will the European Union 
abandon the Nabucco project?  Will this abandoned project enable Russia to build the 
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South Stream pipeline? Will Russia gain a stronger influence in the Central Asia and the 
South Caucuses and merely redirect energy sources to China?  Although, some observers, 
including the International Energy Agency, believe global natural gas supply may exceed 
demand as early as 2015, it is likely that Europe will still require natural gas from Russia 
to meet it future energy needs.   Therefore, examining the policy implications concerning 
energy diplomacy amongst Europe, Russia, and the Caspian Basin is a central focus of 
this thesis. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will utilize a comparative study to analyze the policy implication of 
unconventional gas exploration. The first area of examination will be the rigid pipeline-
based conventional natural gas market that currently exists in Europe and Eurasia. 
Advantages and disadvantages within this framework, and prospects for future 
development or conflicts will be explored. Furthermore, historic energy disputes and 
relationships will be introduced to emphasize the positive and negative aspects of the 
pipeline system.   The physical infrastructure and government, international, and private 
actors will be described as well. After reviewing the traditional pipeline energy market, 
this thesis will explore the unconventional natural gas industry—shale gas exploration 
and Liquefied Natural Gas. First, an examination of shale gas’ impact in the U.S. energy 
market will be reviewed, which will be followed by exploring the effect of these energy 
resources in Europe. After investigating the current unconventional gas market, prospects 
for future exploration and controversies will be explored. Thus, this thesis will compare 
the contemporary natural gas pipeline market and current unconventional gas market, the 
ramifications both markets have on European and Eurasian energy security, future 
prospects for expansions, and possible sources of contention within both frameworks, 
which will lead to an examination of future policy implications. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In order to illustrate how unconventional natural gas innovations have altered the 
energy security relationships between Russia, the former Soviet republics, and Europe, 
the thesis will open with an examination of the contemporary Eurasian energy bridge. 
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The first chapter will provide an overview of Russian pipelines that supply Eurasian 
energy to Europe. In a survey of traditional natural gas pipeline transit routes, this thesis 
will highlight the monopolistic power employed by the Kremlin in Eastern Europe, 
Central Asia, and the Caspian Region. After exploring advantages and disadvantages of 
the current pipeline system, this chapter will examine the Nord Steam pipeline as a lens 
for viewing geopolitical tensions of pipeline politics between Europe and Russian and 
among EU member states. In order to further explore European-Eurasian energy 
relations, the first chapter will review EU-Russian competition in the Southern Gas 
Corridor through examining the projected gas market through 2035. The chapter will also 
examine how EU-Russian competition in the southern gas corridor illustrates the EU’s 
inability to compete with Russia in pipeline politics, developing the South Stream 
pipeline will not significantly alter contemporary pipeline politics governing the Eurasian 
Energy Bridge.   The first chapter’s conclusion will highlight possible avenues for 
European energy diversity.   
The second chapter will explore shale gas and LNG innovations and their 
repercussions on U.S. and European markets over the last decade in to illustrate the 
growing international natural gas marketplace and the likelihood these market forces will 
make a significant difference in European and Eurasian energy security. After reviewing 
the effects of unconventional natural gas exploration and shipment, this thesis will 
examine the problems facing expanding unconventional gas exploration—environmental 
concerns and monetary constraints. In general, this thesis will focus on the prospects of 
developing shale gas resources in Europe/Eurasia as these energy resources will directly 
influence energy security in the region. The second chapter’s conclusion will illustrate 
how shale gas and LNG advances are reshaping the European-Eurasian gas markets and 
highlight critical policy choices facing the EU, Russia, and Caspian hydrocarbon states.     
After assessing unconventional natural gas innovation and its direct effect on the 
Eurasian energy bridge, the third chapter will examine the domestic and foreign policy 
implications of this paradigm shift in Eurasian energy security. The third chapter will 
initially assess the impacts of LNG and shale gas on Russia’s domestic energy industry 
and how an emerging international gas market will alter Russia’s relations with Europe, 
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the Caspian Basin, and China. Then the future of the Caspian region, traditionally viewed 
as a key to energy security, will be explored. Finally, the chapter will examine how 
natural gas innovations provide a significant incentive for EU internal market integration, 
which will lead to an investigation of future energy relations between the EU, Russia, and 
the Caspian hydrocarbon states in transition to the conclusion of the thesis.   
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II. THE CONTEMPORARY EURASIAN ENERGY BRIDGE 
Europe predominantly relies on Russian pipelines to meet its natural gas needs, 
but this delivery method is rife with energy instability. The vulnerability of pipeline 
delivery was exposed by the 2007 gas disputes between Russia and Belarus and the 2006 
and 2009 gas disruptions caused by pricing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine.31  
Consequently, these energy clashes bolstered European Union (EU) and Russian 
initiatives to foster energy security. European and Russian visions of energy security 
converged with the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline that bypassed troubling 
transit states, like Ukraine and Belarus, while reducing transit fees.32  Even though transit 
instability was reduced, Nord Stream expanded Russia’s stake in European gas imports.  
Russia’s dominant role in the EU’s import energy mix has led Brussels to 
consider alternative supplies. Because the EU relies on pipelines to supply natural gas, 
the closest alternative market lies in the Caspian region. This actuality has galvanized EU 
support for developing a gas bulwark against Russia via the Nabucco pipeline. Russia, 
however, has proposed the South Stream as a competitor.33  Despite proclamations from 
Berlin and Moscow that both pipelines are mutually reinforcing, this chapter will show 
that Nabucco and South Stream are competitive and the construction of either project will 
negate the need for a second pipeline.34  More importantly, the Nabucco/South Stream 
rivalry highlights the EU’s competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Russia concerning 
contemporary pipeline politics.   
This chapter will examine the contemporary Eurasian energy bridge by opening 
with an overview of Russian pipelines that supply Eurasian energy to Europe. After 
exploring advantages and disadvantages of the current pipeline system, this chapter will 
examine the Nord Steam pipeline as a lens for viewing geopolitical tensions of pipeline 
                                                 
31  Whist, Nord Stream: Not just a Pipeline, 14.  
32 Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe, 8. 
33 Ibid., 56. 
34 “Merkel: Nabucco not Competing with Nord Stream,” Baltic News Service, July 16, 2009, accessed 
October 3, 2012, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.   
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politics between Europe and Russian and among EU member states. In order to further 
exploration of European-Eurasian energy relations, this chapter will review EU-Russian 
competition in the Southern Gas Corridor through examination of the projected gas 
market through 2035 to contend that EU energy demand does not require the Nabucco 
and South Stream pipelines. This chapter will go on to compare the Nabucco and South 
Stream projects, their proposed routes, consortium members, goals and motivations for 
development, and challenges to development. Because South Stream is the project most 
likely to be completed, the influence of this pipeline on exporters, transit states, and 
customers will be explored as well. The chapter’s conclusion will examine how EU-
Russian competition in the southern gas corridor illustrates the EU’s inability to compete 
with Russia in pipeline politics, developing the South Stream pipeline will not 
significantly alter contemporary pipeline politics governing the Eurasian Energy Bridge, 
and possible avenues for European energy diversity. 
A. THE CONTEMPORARY EURASIAN PIPELINE BRIDGE 
 
 Eurasian pipeline network35 Figure 1. 
                                                 
35 “Russia: Key Facts/Pipelines,” BBC News, accessed September 27, 2012,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/456900/456974/html/nn4page1.stm.   
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Seven pipeline systems currently connect Russia with Central and Western 
Europe. Three of these pipelines traverse Ukraine (Brotherhood, Polar Lights, and Trans-
Balkans) and provide 175 bcm/year capacity to Europe. These systems are all remnants 
of the Soviet Pipeline grid built before 1991. Yamal-Europe is the second largest transit 
pipeline through Belarus and Poland and provides 33 bcm/year of natural gas. Russia has 
also constructed three direct pipeline projects—Finland connector, Nord Stream to 
Germany, and Blue Stream to Turkey—that provide 20 bcm, 56 bcm, and 16 bcm of gas 






Brotherhood/Union Russia/Ukraine/Central Europe Soviet Pipeline 
Grid 
130 
Polar Lights Russia/Belarus/Ukraine/Europe Soviet Pipeline 
Grid 
25 
Trans-Balkans Russia/Ukraine/Balkans Soviet Pipeline 
Grid 
20 
Finland Connector Russia/Finland Extended 1999 20 
Yamal-Europe Russia/Belarus/Poland/Europe 1999 33 
Blue Stream Russia/Black Sea/Turkey 2002 16 
Nord Stream Russia/Baltic Sea/Germany 2011 56 
Table 1.   Russia’s pipeline export infrastructure to Europe (in bcm)36 
1. Advantages 
Pipelines are often the favored transport method for natural gas because other 
options, like LNG, require technical and expensive infrastructure investment. Lower 
costs can be passed on to consumers via lower prices. Furthermore, overland pipelines 
have a life-span of thirty-five to sixty years and lower maintenance requirements than 
                                                 
36 Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe, 70. 
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competing delivery methods.37  Thus, natural gas remains the most economical delivery 
method up to 3,000 km before transport costs rise enough for LNG to compete.38  Europe 
pipeline interconnectors have also served an important role in creating regional 
competitiveness by enabling reversible gas flows to offset gas disruptions and combining 
energy resources from several importers to converge into one gas hub, creating a multi-
regional market. For example, the Bacton-Zeebrugge interconnector, an underwater 
pipeline from the UK to Europe, has facilitated Russian, British and Norwegian gas 
competition. Some believe interconnectors will be the vehicle to develop a unified EU 
energy policy.39  Despite development in European interconnectors and economical gas 
transport, pipelines deliver significant disadvantages. 
2. Disadvantages 
Even though pipeline interconnectors deliver supplies from multiple suppliers, 
pipeline gas is still predominantly a regional market. Until alternative energy sources 
provide a more dominant portion of Europe’s energy mix, pipeline gas remains a regional 
market.40  Moreover, pipeline markets are subject to regional pricing, such as Russian’s 
long-term purchase contracts. Regional gas prices are not related to supply or demand, 
but are often linked to world oil prices. For example, the value of gas to Europe is 
determined by the price of oil substitutes—called replacement value.41  Thus, European 
gas prices cannot effectively react to supply and demand. Additionally, competition 
between oil and gas resources cannot be harnessed because gas prices are linked to the oil 
market.42  In addition to price constraints, contemporary pipelines may hobble political 
action as well.   
Russia’s history of using energy as a means of blackmailing Europe persists. 
Some analysts affirm that Europe’s inaction during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war was 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 47. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 53–54. 
40 Ibid., 47. 
41 Ibid., 50. 
42 Ibid., 96. 
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due its reliance on Russian gas and fear of gas shutoffs as a reaction to political 
opposition.43  A more recent example of EU-Russian political opposition is the current 
European Commission (EC) anti-trust case against Gazprom. On September 4, 2012, the 
EC opened an antitrust probe against Gazprom for three charges: “preventing gas trading 
across national borders; hindering diversification of supply; and unfairly linking gas and 
oil prices.”44 This action may seem like a positive step for unified EU energy relations 
with Moscow. Yet, President Vladimir Putin responded by signing a decree on September 
11th that prohibited “strategic firms” from providing information to foreign investigators 
without Moscow’s permission. Consequently, Gazprom has stopped providing contract 
details to the EC. Moves by the EC to liberalize and unbundle European pipeline 
infrastructure from energy companies have met similar loggerheads. Lithuania is one of 
the EU states that is most inclined towards unbundling, but has the highest gas prices in 
Europe. Its current government is facing defeat in the upcoming October elections and 
cites high gas prices as one of many examples of Russian meddling in Lithuanian 
politics. On September 12, 2012, Russia informed Moldova—the poorest EU country—
that its gas rates would dramatically increase if the country did not renounce the EU’s 
unbundling policies.45  Incidentally, French and German politicians and energy firms 
have historically opposed EU unbundling efforts.46  Russia can make such demands and 
may hold sway over larger EU nations because of its monopolistic positing as a gas 
provider—especially in Eastern Europe.   
                                                 
43 Richard J. Anderson, “Europe’s Dependence on Russian Natural Gas: Perspectives and 
Recommendations for a Long-Term Strategy,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 
Occasional Paper series, No. 19 (September 2008), 41–2; Kenneth B. Medlock, Amy M. Jaffe, and Peter R. 
Hartley, Shale Gas and U.S. National Security (Houston: Rice University Baker Institute, July 2011), 
accessed October 2, 2012,  http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas-
07192011.pdf, 54. 
44 “Burst Valves: The European Union Squeezes Gazprom. Russia Retaliates,” Economist, September 
15, 2012, Section: Europe, 52. 
45 Ibid. 
46 “EU Tries—Again—to Split Utilities,” Bloomberg Businessweek, September 19, 2007, accessed 
October 2, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007–09–19/eu-tries-again-to-split-
utilitiesbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; Judy Dempsey, “Germans Attack 
EU Energy Proposal,” International Herald Tribune, 10 October 2007, F1. 
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Most European nations and international policy centers, including the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), believe an undiversified energy supply is the 
foundation of EU energy insecurity. While the EU produces one-third of its gas 
domestically, the preponderance of gas supplies originate from three primary sources: 
Russia provides over 40 percent of EU gas imports, while 23 percent originates in 
Norway and 17 percent in Algeria.47   EU member states are aware of this reality. In 
2011, The European Commission affirmed, “the security of the EU’s primary energy 
supplies may be threated if a high proportion of imports are concentrated among 
relatively few partners. Close to four-fifths of the EU-27’s imports of natural gas in 2009 
came from Russia, Norway, or Algeria.”48  These apprehensions are rooted in several 
Russian energy disputes in the first decade of the 21st Century. The 2006 Russia-Ukraine 
gas disagreement halted the delivery of 100 million cubic meters of gas to Europe. In 
2007, the Russian-Belarus energy clash direly affected Europe’s economy. Ukraine 
subsequently siphoned gas from its pipeline to Europe in an attempt to hold European 
households hostage during a row with Russia over gas prices in 2009.49 EU energy 
security is likely to worsen as the EC forecasts its gas imports will increase to over 84 
percent by 2030.50  Consequently, the EC has provided monetary and diplomatic support 
to ten gas and electricity projects that were dubbed in “European interest.”51  One such 
project is the Nord Stream pipeline. 
B. NORD STREAM: RUSSIA’S TROJAN HORSE? 
Although multiple energy disputes would seem like a boon for the Nord Stream 
project, current political sentiment in the Baltic States, Belarus, Poland, Scandinavia, 
                                                 
47 Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe, 44; Kari Liuhto ed., 
The EU-Russia gas connection: Pipes, politics and problems (Turku School of Economics: Pan-European 
Institute, August 2009), 8,  accessed October 2, 2009, 
http://www.tse.fi/FI/yksikot/erillislaitokset/pei/Documents/Julkaisut/Liuhto percent200809 
percent20web.pdf, 96.  
48 European Commission – Eurostat, “Energy production and imports,” September 2011, accessed 
September 1, 2012, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained 
/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports. 
49 Liuhto, The EU-Russia gas connection, 96.  
50 Liuhto, The EU-Russia gas connection, 96. 
51 Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Oil and Gas Delivery to Europe, 54. 
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Ukraine, and some European policy centers appear overwhelmingly opposed to Gazprom 
fuel in the heart of Europe.52  Therefore, Nord Stream can serve as an effective case 
study concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the contemporary Eurasian energy 
bridge. To better appreciate the risks and rewards of this pipeline, a survey of the 
arguments for and against the project will be presented.   
1. Pipeline Proponents 
On November 8, 2011, several European leaders attended the Nord Stream 
pipeline’s opening ceremony. Chancellor Merkel, President Medvedev, French Prime 
Minister Fillon, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, and the EU’s energy commission, 
Günther Oettinger, all participated. As these leaders opened the pipeline, Russian natural 
gas flowed directly from Vyborg, Russia, to Lubmin, Germany, via a 1,224 kilometer 
conduit along the Baltic seabed bypassing the Baltic States, Belarus, Poland, and 
Ukraine. The Nord Stream currently supplies over 55 bcm/year to the heart of Europe.53  
The Nord Stream pipeline was named a “project of European Interest” by the EU 
Commission, European Parliament, and Council of the European Union in 2006. Nord 
Stream’s multinational consortium—comprised of Russia’s Gazprom, Germany’s 
BASF/Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas, Dutch firm Nederlandse Gasunie, and France’s 
GDF SUEZ—touted the project’s critical role in long-term European energy stability. 
Additionally, the pipeline was constructed at no cost to taxpayers.54  Non-Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) states may argue that Nord Stream is a sensible energy option because 
transit state insecurity is relegated and economic interdependence with Russia reduces 
future threats, but open support from politicians and the aforementioned EU agencies has 
not erased the shadow over the Nord Stream project that has been present since Vladimir 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 71; Arne Schröer, “European Energy Security: A New Pattern of External Stability and 
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Putin and Gerhard Schröder announced the contract in 2005.55   Nord Stream’s role in 
bolstering EU energy security has been eclipsed by concerns about the consequences of 
increased reliance on Russian energy.  
2. Arguments against Nord Stream 
Myriad concerns permeate the Nord Stream debate. Some objections are 
environmental, some are military in nature, such as Sweden’s reservations that Nord 
Stream may further contaminate the already polluted Baltic and the pipeline may stymie 
European investment in renewable energy. Additionally, the Scandinavian states fear a 
Russian military presence in their territorial waters under the guise of military protection 
of Russia’s strategic energy investment.56   Yet, several European Union members are 
apprehensive about Russia’s increased potential to leverage energy exports and the 
undermining of EU solidarity. 
Even though some perceive Russia as unscrupulous in the ways it provides 
energy, Europe’s energy insecurity does not derive from the nationality of its providers, 
but from the concentration of its energy suppliers. As of 2009, dependence on Russian 
energy in Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia was absolute as these nations received 
100 percent of their natural gas from Russia. Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Greece purchased 75 percent of their energy from Russia, while Poland, Romania, and 
Slovenia were dependent on Russia for over 50 percent of their energy.57  Thus, Nord 
Stream amplifies Russia’s near-monopolistic power by giving Moscow the ability to 
restrict gas flows to the Baltic states,  Belarus, Poland, and Ukraine without interrupting 
energy supplies to Germany and Western Europe—Russia’s largest customers. 
Furthermore, the Kremlin has a history of linking gas prices to political subservience. 
This linkage is observable in the recent interaction between Russia, Moldova and 
Lithuania cited above. Some analysts forecast increased Russia’s energy influence in 
Western Europe via planned pipeline connectors reaching Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
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56 Larsson, Nord Stream, Sweden and Baltic Sea Security, 7.  
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the United Kingdom—states that currently do not receive Russian gas.58   As EU 
dependence on imported gas grows to over 80 percent and production in the North Sea 
decreases by 40 percent before 2020, the EU may find itself the victim of Russian energy 
blackmail.59    
Poland and other EU member states fear the influence that Russia could gain 
through a Russo-German energy entente. Russia’s Gazprom owns 51 percent of the Nord 
Stream pipeline; thus, Moscow potentially controls the flow of gas into Germany. 
Additionally, Gazprom’s status as a domestic monopoly may limit German companies’ 
ability to negotiate prices or quantities. Nord Stream’s registration in Switzerland also 
prevents Germany from gaining insight into the consortium’s activities. Russia has the 
ability to control downstream actions of German companies or German infrastructure 
itself via its major stake in the consortium.60   Therefore, Moscow’s battle against EU 
unbundling is an effort to retain Gazprom’s controlling stake in European downstream 
projects. Some European policy analysts question Nord Stream’s economic viability and 
conclude that it is primarily a political project between Russia and Germany at the 
expense of the Federal Republic of Germany’s smaller neighbors to the east.61    
Nord Stream is a poignant reminder that bilateralism is still prevalent in the 
European Union, especially concerning energy and Russia. Thus, the real peril of Nord 
Stream may not be increased Russian influence, but demoralized EU political solidarity 
and reinvigorated Russian motivation to follow a divide-and-coerce foreign policy. A 
unified EU could have pressured Russia to develop additional overland pipelines through 
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the Baltic countries or Poland thereby increasing capacity from Russia, while negotiating 
a competitive price. Moreover, overland pipelines would have cost less than the Nord 
Stream project and could have increased revenues via transit fees to bolster the 
economies of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Yet, the pursuit of European “energy 
nationalism” squandered this opportunity to develop a non-divisive pipeline project and 
foster EU unity.62  Although Nord Stream has been operational since November 2011 
and the Nord Stream Consortium opened the second pipeline in late 2012, this project 
only supports one pillar of EU energy security—reducing transit state instability. 
C. EU-RUSSIAN ENERGY COMPETITION IN THE SOUTHERN GAS 
CORRIDOR 
Gazprom is still the largest importer of gas to Europe; approximately 40 percent 
of EU gas imports come from Russia.63  Therefore, Europe is still at risk of Russian 
energy blackmail and additional infrastructure projects are necessary to diversify gas 
supplies away from Russia. The Nabucco pipeline is one of the key projects that the EU 
supports financially and diplomatically to weaken Russia’s monopolistic power.64    Yet, 
Russia has countered the Nabucco pipeline with its South Stream project through the 
Black Sea. Despite proclamations from the Berlin and Moscow that both pipelines are 
mutually reinforcing, this section will show that Nabucco and South Stream are 
competitive and the construction of either project will negate the need for a second 
pipeline.65  Moreover, the Nabucco/South Stream rivalry highlights the EU’s inability to 
complete with Russia in contemporary pipeline politics.   
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 Gas networks of Central Asia66 Figure 2. 
1. Competing Pipelines? 
Germany and Russia, the heavyweight political leaders in the Nabucco and South 
Stream pipelines projects, respectively, both contend that these pipelines can serve 
mutually reinforcing purposes. German Chancellor Angela Merkel confirmed in a 2009 
press conference that Nabucco is not intended to threaten Russia’s Nord Stream and 
South Stream projects, “We need not treat it as some kind of antagonism to other 
pipelines.”67  While then-President of Russia Dmitri Medvedev supported Merkel’s 
statement, affirming, “We do not have the least envy with respect to Nabucco; let it 
develop on its own. If gas starts moving via Nabucco, someone consequently needs it.”68  
At the political level, both states support the projects and affirm their cooperative efforts. 
This amicable viewpoint is echoed at the industry level.   
The mutual benefits of Russia’s South Stream and the EU-backed Nabucco 
pipelines was extolled at the 24th World Gas Conference held in 2009 at Buenos Aires. 
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At this industry conference, the Hungarian office of Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
(KPMG)—a global accounting and advisory service company—presented an analysis of 
the Nabucco and South Stream projects. In this report, the authors explained that without 
support from South Stream, Nabucco will only be able to meet European demand through 
2016. The report further explained that South Stream could only provide adequate supply 
through 2020. Consequently, Nabucco and South Stream—in tandem—could provide 93 
billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, over one-third of the total demand in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), and supply CEE through 2026. Yet, the report highlights a 
possible motivation for proposing both projects, “This way the natural gas demand of the 
CEE could be satisfied until 2026 without raising the need for further infrastructural 
development.”69 It is possible that KPMG and Russia may support the Nabucco project to 
keep Europe from investing in technologies, like liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, 
that could truly diversify sources from Russia or CIS nations. The report asserts, “As 
Nabucco and South Stream projects are designed to bridge a distance of less than 4,000 
km passing mainly overland…LNG technology would be of limited interest.”70 Still, the 
Kremlin claims it is not worried about Europe’s move to diversify. According to 
Gazprom’s Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev, “Even if we count in the gas volumes 
supplied to Europe through Nord Stream, South Stream, Nabucco, and LNG supplies, 
Europe will still have a supply deficit of 15–20 billion cubic meters/year.”71 Yet, 
Gazprom’s and KPMG’s claims are based on inaccurate demand forecasts. 
The Gazprom and KPMG assessment are based on the assumption that European 
demand for Central Asian gas will require 31 bcm/year by 2020 and demand will 
continue to grow at a steady rate.72  The initial demand assessment appears to be 
validated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which forecasted in the World 
Energy Outlook 2011, gas flows through the southern corridor will reach 34 bcm/year by 
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2020; however, the IEA foresees southern gas flows declining to 31bcm/year in 2035 due 
to Europe’s clean energy policies and investment in energy efficient technologies.73  
Despite supporting both pipelines as the best option for Europe’s long-term energy 
future, KPMG’s report admits the 93 bcm capacity of both pipelines exceeds demand in 
in the CEE region, which will likely lead to “unused pipeline capability” or “competition 
between Nabucco and every other Eastern pipeline.”74 Not only do Nabucco and South 
Stream compete to meet European demand, but both projects contend for transit states 
and supply sources as well. 
Enroute to their destinations in Central Europe, the South Stream and Nabucco 
project overlap in several transit states, which are also gas customers. Three of five 
Nabucco transit states—Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria—also comprise part of the 
proposed South Stream route. Thus, both pipelines will not only be competing for energy 
customers, but also for funding to develop the transit infrastructure in these three 
countries.75  Yet, the most significant competition between Nabucco and South Stream is 
for supplier countries. The South Stream consortium effectively targeted Nabucco’s 
potential supply base by locking in long-term supply contracts before the Nabucco 
consortium was able to negotiate energy deals.76  Furthermore, some of the supply 
contacts secured by Russia and the European Union may not be feasibly fulfilled by 
supplier nations. For example, Turkmenistan already supplies pipelines to Russia, Iran, 
and China, but is also contemplating projects to increase gas flows to Russia and Iran, 
while supporting the trans-Caspian portion of the Nabucco pipeline. Ariel Cohen argues 
that Turkmenistan does not have the gas reserves to supply these competing projects, 
which brings Nabucco and the South Stream into direct competition for Turkmen gas.77  
While rivalry between the two pipelines may seem like positive news for customers, 
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whom may benefit from lower prices, the likely outcome is that duplication of supply 
sources, transit states, and customers creates the foundation for economically unviable 
pipeline projects.78   Therefore, the pipeline that is sourced and funded first will likely 
render the competing pipeline obsolete. Consequently, examining the feasibility of each 
pipeline is essential to understanding which project will likely span the Southern Gas 
Corridor and the geostrategic implications of this pipeline’s development. 
2. Nabucco: “The New Gas Bridge from Asia to Europe” 
The Nabucco consortium—comprised of OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), 
Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), Transgaz (Romania), BOTAS (Turkey), and RWE (Germany)—
hail this pipeline “the new gas bridge from Asia to Europe.”79  Although the Nabucco is 
currently planned to span 3,300 kilometers from Erzurum, Turkey—fed by the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline—to Austria by transiting Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Hungary, this project will not reach Asian gas supplies.80  Yet, the United States has used 
diplomacy in an attempt to recruit Kazakhstan into the project, and the EU has sent 
delegations to secure Turkmen gas supplies to feed a trans-Caspian section of the 
Nabucco pipeline to the BTE terminal in Baku, Azerbaijan.81  Not only would Central 
Asian contributions to the Nabucco support a true Asian-European gas bridge, but these 
sources are essential to the viability of the pipeline, which will be examined in more 
detail below. Nevertheless, the Nabucco consortium has deftly provided maneuvering 
room concerning the pipeline route by proposing a streamlined option dubbed “Nabucco 
West,” which begins at the Turkish-Bulgarian border and transports a diminished amount 
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of gas—10 to 23 bcm/year opposed to 31 bcm/year originally promised—to European 
customers.82     
a. Rationale 
As four of the consortium companies are headquartered in EU member 
states and Turkey is an aspiring EU member, the EU supports this pipeline and has 
selected it as a priority project by providing EU 200 million towards the first construction 
stage.83  The key EU motivation for supporting this project is to reduce Russia’s 
dominance over Europe’s natural gas market. Russia is Europe’s largest gas importer 
(39.1 percent), followed by Norway (23.5 percent), North Africa (11.6 percent), and LNG 
imports (9.9 percent). Moreover, much of Central and Eastern Europe is wholly 
dependent on Russia for natural gas.84  During Moscow’s January 2009 gas dispute with 
Kiev over gas pricing and Ukrainian Naftogaz’s debt to Gazprom, daily gas flow to 
Europe reduced from 225 cubic meters to 40 cubic meters amid a severe cold spell.85  
This event was a poignant reminder of Europe’s dependence and vulnerability. At the 
time of this dispute, ninety percent of Russian gas exports to Europe flowed through 
Ukraine. This incident spurred European investment in the Nord Stream and Nabucco 
pipelines to eliminate transit choke points, but the EU has rallied behind the Nabucco 
project to invest in an alternative to Russian gas.86  Therefore, Brussels views both 
Russia and Ukraine as sources of instability and future gas disruptions. Incidentally, one 
of the most determined supporters for development of the Southern Gas Corridor has not 
been a European country, but the United States.   
While the United States primarily invested in crude oil infrastructure in 
the Southern Gas Corridor, U.S. diplomacy was central to the completion of the BTE or 
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South Caucuses gas pipeline, which is an essential energy source for Nabucco.87 
Washington diplomatically supports Nabucco as a method for the EU to decrease 
dependence on Russian energy supplies. U.S. strategy is focused on diminishing Russia’s 
coercive influence on its CEE NATO allies. Gazprom’s monopolistic position, especially 
in Eastern Europe, is even viewed by some as a threat to NATO’s decision making 
process.88  Russia has the potential to exert political influence in NATO member states 
with threats of gas shutoffs, which could influence how NATO members vote on military 
and humanitarian interventions or even internal policies. Thus, developing an alternative 
gas bridge to Central and Eastern Europe provides these nations an option for avoiding 
Russian gas cutoffs. Additionally, the United States not only seeks to diminish Russian 
coercion in Europe, but desires to limit Moscow’s influence in its near abroad. By 
promoting western investment in the Caspian Basin, Central Asian and South Caucus 
states are given an alternative hydrocarbon customer to Russia. Furthermore, Gazprom’s 
ability to demand below market prices will be eroded, which has already started due to 
China’s entrance into Central Asia.89   Yet, hydrocarbon development in the Caspian 
Basin is not a simple process of applying free market principles. Several significant 
geopolitical factors preclude Nabucco’s development.  
b. Challenges 
Geography is one of the first challenges to Nabucco’s construction. 
Although access to Caspian and Central Asian energy reserves was the original 
justification for the Nabucco pipeline, these supply sources have not materialized.90  In 
order to transit natural gas beneath the Caspian Sea, the littoral states—including 
Russia—must reach an agreement on the division of the waters and seabed, which has 
been a legal issue since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conversely, piping Central 
Asian natural gas to China and Russia is less risky and less expensive than the undersea 
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or LNG tanker methods required to reach European markets directly.91 Turkey presents 
another geopolitical factor in the Nabucco equation. If this pipeline is realized, Turkey 
will become a natural bottleneck in the Southern Gas Corridor, akin to Belarus and 
Ukraine—albeit not as powerful. Thus, the EU’s desire to reduce transit instability will 
not be fully achieved through the construction of the Nabucco pipeline.   
In addition to geopolitical issues, Nabucco requires adequate funding to 
reach fruition. According to Jeffrey Mankoff’s July 2012 assessment, the Nabucco is still 
severely underfunded.92 Moreover, western firms are at a disadvantage when competing 
with Russian and Chinese firms, especially in Central Asia, due to lack of guaranteed 
state financing.93  Brussels is further hindered in Central Asian dealings because 
Ashgabat tends to favor bilateral negotiations over engaging multilateral frameworks.94  
Due to lack of investment in the Nabucco project, the pipeline consortium and western 
politicians may not be able to secure energy deposits in Turkmenistan if they cannot 
convince Ashgabat that Turkmen gas will reach European markets. Moreover, the 2008 
Russo-Georgian War, which caused British Petroleum to shutdown pipeline operations 
for forty-eight hours, led to perceptions of regional instability, and reduced western 
financial support for developing the Southern Gas Corridor.95  Thus, the Nabucco 
consortium is not likely to muster sufficient funds unless the European Union provides 
substantial financial support.96   
Despite its economic shortfalls, the Nabucco consortium’s most 
significant challenge is securing energy supplies. As of yet, there is no determined gas 
source to supply Nabucco. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Iraq have 
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all been named as potential sources for the Nabucco pipeline, but only Baku has formally 
committed significant gas resources to this project.97 While there is concern that 
Turkmenistan may not be able to produce enough gas to support Russia, China, and trans-
Caspian gas projects to the west, an oil advisory company— Gaffney Cline & 
Associates—confirmed in a 2008 study that Turkmenistan does possess sufficient natural 
gas deposits to support increased exports to Russia, Europe’s Nabucco, and the 
Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline.98 However, the vital concern should not be the amount 
of Turkmen gas, but Ashgabat’s political will to support Nabucco.   
In May 2007, Turkmenistan signed an agreement with Kazakhstan and 
Russia to provide an additional 30 bcm/year to Russia via a new pre-Caspian pipeline. 
This project will allow Russia to meet future EU energy demand. Moreover, the 30 
bcm/year supplied by the pre-Caspian pipeline matches the entire projected capacity of 
the Nabucco pipeline, which has created viability and investment issues for Nabucco. 
While the Nabucco consortium has yet to secure Turkmen gas supplies, the pre-Caspian 
pipeline feasibility study is complete and the pipeline contract is undergoing draft 
negations. Thus, the pre-Caspian project appears to be a higher priority than Nabucco in 
Ashgabat.99   Because Central Asian gas exporters have not supported Nabucco, 
European leaders and consortium members have suggested Iranian resources to make 
Nabucco economically viable.100  Yet, the EU’s support of UN sanctions against Iran 
renders Tehran’s inclusion unlikely in the short-term. Furthermore, Iran’s increasing 
domestic demand places its potential export quantities on a diminishing curve.101  
Incidentally, Gazprom has even tried to enter the Nabucco consortium, which would be a 
boon to the project, but defeat Nabucco’s purpose of diversifying away from Russian 
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gas.102  In 2010, Turkish Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdoğan summarized Nabucco’s 
dilemma best: “The Nabucco pipeline needs 30 billion m3 (cubic meters) of natural gas 
every year. Could Nabucco find such a supply at the moment?  No, it could not. There is 
no gas. There is no pipeline. So what are we talking about?”103  Consequently, Nabucco’s 
construction has been pushed to 2013, and gas is not set to flow (initially 6 bcm) until 
2017.104  Conversely, the South Stream Consortium has schedule pipeline construction 
for early 2013 and projects 16 bcm/year of gas by 2015 and full 63 bcm/year capacity by 
2018.105  South Stream’s progress does not bode well for Nabucco’s future.      
3. South Stream: “Energizing Europe” 
South Stream is currently planned to span 3,700 km from the Russian 
Federation—with a 900 km portion under the Black Sea—through Central Europe into 
Germany. A separate 100 km offshoot is planned through Greece—under the Adriatic 
Sea—to Italy. South Stream would traverse seven transit countries (Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, Greece, and Italy) that have all already pledged official 
participation in the project.106  Additionally, Turkey agreed in December 2011 to allow 
Russia to build the Black Sea portion of this pipeline in its territorial waters. Despite a 
preponderance of EU member states, Brussels is not expected to provide any financing to 
this project due to Russia’s dominant stake in the consortium.107   
South Stream’s financing follows separate frameworks for transit infrastructure 
and offshore pipelines. For overland routes, Gazprom and transit states will provide joint 
financing (50–50) for the pipelines that traverse their territories, and Russia and Italy will 
equally share the costs of the Adriatic pipeline. Concerning the offshore section through 
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the Black Sea, a consortium of all private investors has been established. The South 
Stream consortium is comprised of Russia’s Gazprom (50 percent), Italy’s Eni S.p.A (20 
percent), France’s EDF (15 percent), and Germany’s BASF Wintershall (15 percent). 
Therefore, the offshore section will be created at no cost to European taxpayers.108   
South Stream’s participating states are set to make their final investment decisions in late 
2012, and construction is forecasted to begin in early 2013. Moreover, 16 bcm of natural 
gas is scheduled to flow in late 2015. By early 2017, South Stream is forecasted to 
provide 31.5 bcm, while Nabucco is projected to produce only 6 bcm starting in 2017.109    
a. Rationale  
In spite of South Stream’s benign motto, “Energizing Europe,” several 
analysts believe Russia’s primary motivation is to further its perceived opaque designs in 
international relations. Alexander Ghaleb argues that Russia seeks to use natural gas “as a 
weapon with which to reestablish dominance throughout the territory of the former Soviet 
Union and to reassert its primacy over both the energy-producing states of Central Asia 
and energy consuming states in Europe.”110 He further states that South Stream 
reinforces the Kremlin’s ultimate foreign policy tactic in Europe—divide and rule—by 
enabling Moscow to turn off the gas to the Baltic States, Belarus, Poland, and Ukraine, 
without affecting its largest customers in Europe.111  Paul Domjan and Matt Stone, 
Eurasian energy analysts and consultants, agree that South Stream is primarily fueled by 
the Kremlin’s interest to reassert geopolitical power over Central Asia and its European 
energy customers.112 Ariel Cohen argues that this desire for dominance was manifested 
in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and Russia’s declarations of independence for South 
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Ossetia and Abkhazia were crafted to give Russia control over the overland export routes 
from Central Asia to Europe.113  At first glance, Russia’s Energy Ministry supports these 
hypotheses. In the “Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030,” the Russian 
Energy Ministry affirms, Russia “provides 25 percent of the world trade in natural gas, 
dominating both on the European gas market and on the gas market of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.”114  If the Kremlin’s goal is to maintain energy 
dominance, then Russia would be required to block the development of alternative 
pipeline projects in the Southern Gas Corridor.   
There is evidence of Russia’s desire for dominant influence over the 
Eurasian energy bridge. The Russian Energy Ministry states, “Russian pipeline 
infrastructure will become an integral part of the power bridge between Europe and Asia, 
and Russia will become the key center of its management.”115 Russia has prevented 
Kazakhstani companies from signing contracts with western firms and blocked Caspian 
seabed delineation to prevent gas exploration and transport from Central Asia, through 
the South Caucus BTE pipeline, to Europe.116 Consequently, Cohen affirms Russia is 
developing the South Stream to block the development of the Nabucco pipeline.117   
Rafael Fernández agrees that Moscow’s 2007 formal announcement for the South Stream 
project was a direct reaction to the U.S.-backed BTE pipeline ground breaking in 2006, 
which brought Nabucco one-step closer to realization.118  While Russia’s statements and 
actions denote aggressive energy policies focused on maintaining geopolitical influence, 
market forces also drive Gazprom’s managers and executives. 
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The greatest advantage of the South Stream project is that Russia’s 
reliance on Ukraine as a transit state is significantly reduced. Before the development of 
the Nord Stream pipeline, ninety percent of all Russian gas exports to Europe transited 
through Ukraine.119  Russia’s energy ministry affirms that the main risks in the energy 
field are Russia’s dependence on transit countries for export and insufficient 
diversification to consumer markets. Thus, South Stream is one of the most important 
Russian energy projects not only because it bypasses Ukraine, but also because it 
diversifies Russian energy exports to reliable customers—namely Germany and Italy, 
which are the first and second largest EU gas importers.120  While Alexander Ghaleb 
claims profitability was not a key factor in developing South Stream, Jeffrey Mankoff 
offers a more nuanced analysis, “Even if the initial cost of building undersea pipelines is 
higher than building overland, with Nord and South Stream, Gazprom would be freed 
from having to pay transit fees, which are the largest single operating expense.”121 
Another advantage of the Black Sea pipeline is that Turkey’s influence as an energy 
transit state will be diminished. Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary all welcome the South 
Stream as an option to decrease reliance on Turkey as a transit state, which Nabucco 
would amplify.122   Thus, South Stream is not solely a tool of Russian dominance, but a 
confluence of economic and geopolitical interests in Russia and Europe. 
b. Challenges 
South Stream faces two significant hurdles compared to the Nabucco 
project. First, South Stream includes two undersea portions and is more technologically 
risky than Nabucco; however, Gazprom has recently completed seabed pipelines for the 
Nord Stream and is likely to use the expertise gained from this construction project for 
the South Stream as well. Incidentally, Nabucco will not be viable unless an undersea or 
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LNG portion of the energy bridge is built to Central Asia.123  Second, building the South 
Stream pipeline will cost twice as much as Nabucco, which may render South Stream’s 
construction financially prohibitive. If completed, Nabucco will cost $3.5 million per 
kilometer and South Stream (with 30 bcm capacity) will cost $6.7 million to $8.4 million 
per kilometer.124  Yet, the Kremlin is financing the majority of South Stream’s costs, 
which could bode well or ill for this project.125 
Due to reduced Russian energy profits stemming from the 2009 global 
financial downturn, Gazprom may not be able to shoulder the South Stream burden. 
Gazprom is the most indebted company in Russia and currently has several major 
projects under construction, including the second Nord Stream pipeline and the Yamal II 
through Belarus, in addition to gas field exploration and expansion of export routes from 
Central Asia. Due to shared transit states with the Nabucco pipeline, Central and Eastern 
European nations may not be able to handle an additional financial burden if Gazprom 
defaults on its obligations.126  Yet, increasing financial support from transit states and 
consortium partners would decrease Gazprom’s controlling stake in the project. This 
outcome is not palatable to the Kremlin’s strategy of controlling downstream resources; 
thus, Moscow will likely muster the political will to fulfill Gazprom’s obligations if 
South Stream breaks ground. Incidentally, the greatest stumbling block to South Stream’s 
realization is Russia itself. 
Prior to the 2009 gas war with Kiev, Gazprom sought to take control of 
the export routes through Ukraine. After this crisis, Russia’s negotiations with Ukraine 
intensified. As South Stream approaches construction, Moscow’s leverage vis-à-vis Kiev 
grows. If Kiev agrees to allow Gazprom to control the gas routes to Europe and 
guarantees not to disrupt gas flows, Ukraine’s liability as a transit risk significantly 
decreases. Furthermore, Russia is likely to dissolve the costly undersea pipeline project 
because its greatest energy security concern will be met, rendering South Stream 
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irrelevant.127  If Gazprom secures control of Ukraine pipelines and South Stream is 
halted, Russia may continue to build a pipeline from Eastern Europe—below the 
Adriatic—to Italy. If South Stream is cancelled, overdue upgrades to the Soviet-era 
infrastructure that traverses Ukraine will be required. Despite negotiations between 
Ukraine and Russia, Kiev has responded to Moscow’s interludes by proposing a joint 
EU-Gazprom venture to control and modernize its pipeline routes. This concession will 
not likely meet Moscow’s demands; therefore, South Stream appears a likely reality as 
construction of the Black Sea pipeline is scheduled for early 2013.    
4. Implications of South Stream’s Probable Development 
One immediate impact of developing South Stream is Russia’s diminished need 
for transit states. Once fully operational, South Stream and Nord Stream will supply 118 
bcm/year of Russian gas to Europe. In 2010—before the Nord Stream was operational—
Ukraine only transited 99 bcm/year of Russian gas to Europe. In addition to losing 
billions of dollars in transit fees every year, South Stream could render Ukrainian transit 
infrastructure obsolete.128  Additionally, the IEA interprets Russia’s recent energy 
projects as “a major shift in the pattern of gas flows” that will impact not only Ukraine, 
but Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia as Russia bypasses former Soviet 
states.129  The Nord Stream and South Stream developments have led to concerns that 
Russia is building a system to increase its leverage in Eastern Europe without affecting its 
largest customers in Central and Western Europe.        
In addition to reasserting its predominate position in post-Soviet spaces, it is 
feared that Moscow will use its energy monopoly to influence EU foreign policy and 
even NATO decision making.130  Some argue that market forces have weakened Russia’s 
ability to use energy as a political weapon. For example, as result of the 2008 global 
economic downturn, European demand for natural gas decreased in 2009. This trend 
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created excess supply and a consumer’s gas market. Consequently, European customers 
reacted by postponing gas purchases to take advantage of falling gas prices—against 
Gazprom’s wishes for negotiating long-term contracts.131   It may appear that energy 
exporters are currently at the behest of the consumer and Russia’s traditional use of 
energy as a weapon has decreased in proportion to the price and demand for natural gas. 
Yet, Europe’s recent ability to negotiate prices is not the result of changes to the pipeline 
market, but rather is likely the influence of LNG imports and global shale gas production, 
which will be examined in the next chapter.132 
 The EU is further concerned that Russia may not even be able to meet future 
European energy needs due to profit skimming from Russian energy companies and lack 
of reinvestment in new energy fields or infrastructure upgrades. According to Javier 
Solana, while the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
“Due to Russia’s outdated oil and gas pipelines, the equivalent of a quarter of Russia’s 
total gas exports to Europe was being lost in transport.”133  Moreover, increased domestic 
gas use in Russia reduces potential exports to Europe.   Russia historically consumes two-
thirds of the gas it produces.134  Moscow’s commitment to provide fifteen percent of its 
gas exports to China by 2020 further compounds these fears.135  Still, Moscow’s resolve 
to be the “key center” of energy flow to Europe is resilient as evidenced in President 
Putin’s decree to block the EC’s anti-trust investigation of Gazprom. Consequently, there 
is concern that Russia will control Central Asian markets to meet increasing European 
energy demand.136  
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While many fear Russia’s influence and hegemony in Central Asia, Central Asian 
regimes do not view Moscow as a potential threat.137  Even though Russia may try to 
block diversification of Central Asian energy to Europe—because Gazprom relies heavily 
on these gas flows to meet European requirements—instead of developing new gas 
sources to meet rising demand, the Central Asian states do not believe Moscow is strong 
enough to bring former Soviet republics under its exclusive control.138  China’s entrance 
into the Central Asian energy market—through financing and constructing the 
Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline in 2004 and Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline in 2009—
has broken Russia’s monopolistic hold over Central Asia’s energy exports and decreased 
Moscow’s geopolitical influence.139  While some have compared Russian, Chinese, and 
western energy competition as a “new great game,” the Central Asian republics are not at 
the whim of outside powers, but have learned to game the system—balancing the powers 
against each other—for maximum benefit.140  The emerging reality in Central Asia is a 
declining Russia in relation to China’s rising influence—with Europe watching from the 
fringes—unless the EU changes its investment tactics. Western influence in Central Asia 
can expand even if the Nabucco never becomes a reality. The European Union and 
United States still have the opportunity to assist Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan in upstream investment and technological development for extraction and 
exploration. Because investment in upstream technologies will not directly affected 
western energy markets, a mental shift from extractive geopolitics and the great game 
mentality that has overshadowed Central Asian relations is necessary.   
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Russia’s power and influence in Central Asia has already started to wane.141  In 
2008, Russia moved towards world energy prices for gas imports from Central Asia, 
which signaled a weakening of Russia’s hold of inequality over this region. China also 
overtook Russia as the largest Central Asian trading partner in 2010. Furthermore, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan both view China as a more reliable partner due to 
vacillations in Russia’s energy policy.142  China even perceives Russia as a riskier and 
less reliable energy resource than the autocratic regimes in Central Asia.143  Russia is no 
longer seen as a provider of modernity or security because China is assuming this role, 
and western technology and education is preferred to Russian expertise in some Central 
Asian sectors.144  Thus, the Kremlin is facing a dramatic reassessment of Russia’s role as 
the gate keeper between Asia and the west.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The contemporary Eurasian energy bridge may provide economical energy flows 
to Europe and are less costly than other natural gas infrastructure investments; however, 
this chapter has highlighted several drawbacks to Europe’s reliance on natural gas 
pipelines. Most significantly, Russia’s dominating stake as an energy supplier allows 
Moscow the potential leverage to influence individual countries and even thwart 
European policies, like the EC’s initiative to unbundle energy delivery. Consequently, the 
EU has sought methods to decrease reliance on Russian energy and build a defense 
against future gas disruptions. This desire has spurred competition in the Southern Gas 
corridor from Central Asia to Eastern Europe via the Nabucco and South Stream 
pipelines. 
This chapter has also shown that Nabucco and South Stream compete for 
customers, transit states, investors, and natural gas sources. Furthermore, Nabucco faces 
considerable hurdles; most importantly, lack of gas sources to render the pipeline feasible 
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for economic investment. Consequently, construction of only the Nabucco West portion 
(Turkey to Central Europe) has been postponed until an undisclosed date in 2013. 
Conversely, South Stream is scheduled to begin construction of the most difficult and 
expensive section—the Black Sea pipeline—in early 2013. South Stream is likely to 
provide 30 bcm/year by 2017—before Nabucco begins producing 6 bcm/year—rendering 
the EU’s project irrelevant. Yet, South Stream’s probable construction does not solidify 
Moscow’s primacy over the Eurasian energy bridge.   
Although Russia seeks to be the “key center” of the Southern Gas Corridor, 
Gazprom’s project will do little to alter Eurasian energy dynamics. Moscow’s monopoly 
in Central Asia has been lost to growing Chinese investment and influence, and South 
Stream does not condemn Europe to Russian energy domination. Although Russia’s 
voluminous natural gas resources, geostrategic position between Central Asia and 
Europe, and ownership of critical pipeline infrastructure makes the EU’s goal to diversify 
pipeline gas sources away from Gazprom nearly impossible, Moscow’s power over 
Europe has been reduced due to decreased natural gas demand. Still, Europe’s bargaining 
power vis-à-vis Moscow will only last while prices are low or natural gas supply is high. 
The EU is still susceptible to Russian energy leverage because Europe cannot effectively 
create new pipeline routes to diversify gas providers. Thus, the EU must shift its strategy 
from seeking pipelines that bypass Russia or Iran to ensure its energy security. 
Brussels has viable opportunities to diversify energy sources—outside new 
pipeline construction. The EU could shift funding away from Nabucco to increasing 
renewable energy research. Renewable energy is not only central to EU’s values and 
future clean energy goals, but also essential to long-term, domestic energy projection. 
Yet, unconventional gas exploration and transportation (shale gas and LNG) provides 
more-immediate opportunities to diversify energy resources to meet short-term energy 
security and clean energy goals. Several EU member states, including France, Germany, 
Hungary and Poland possess significant shale gas deposits. Furthermore, the EU’s vast 
shoreline provides ample space to build LNG terminals to link Europe to additional gas 
exporters in the Middle East, Africa, and possibly the United States (if the United States 
expands shale gas development). Therefore, the impact of unconventional natural gas 
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innovation on the geopolitical dynamics governing Eurasia’s energy bridge will be 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 45 
III. UNCONVENTIONAL GAS INNOVATIONS: PANACEA, 
PROPAGANDA, OR PRACTICAL SOLUTION? 
Fanfare and fear surround the possibility of Europe’s large-scale investment in 
unconventional natural gas extraction and LNG import capacity.   Proponents of shale gas 
tout its potential to diminish the west’s dependence on unscrupulous energy providers 
and LNG supporters predict an emerging global gas market that will reduce geography’s 
relevance in energy relations. These positive perspectives have been bolstered by the 
recent use of technology to overcome global natural gas scarcity and resource 
competition. Less than a decade ago, global gas reserves were estimated to last only 
seventy more years, but recent advances in hydraulic fracturing, enabling natural gas to 
be extracted from shale rock, have expanded the “life span” of global gas to over 300 
years.145  Despite the revolutionary potential of shale gas and LNG to unshackle the EU 
from energy dependency on Russia, some Europeans fear the “golden age of gas” as 
much as others anticipate it. The most significant uncertainties concerning 
unconventional natural gas are environmental contamination (especially drinking water), 
lack of monetary investment due to economic impracticality, and lack of political will 
reflecting low public acceptance of these innovations. Only a handful of EU member 
states are positioned to overcome these obstacles and extract shale gas in the future; 
therefore, this “revolutionary” energy source will merely serve as a bulwark against 
future gas disruptions. Conversely, LNG is the unconventional energy technology that 
can transform European energy security dynamics. In order to illustrate the degree that 
shale gas and LNG innovations will impact European-Eurasian energy relations, this 
chapter will analyze the contemporary unconventional natural gas market, constraints on 
European unconventional gas investment, and prospects for European shale gas and LNG 
expansion. The chapter’s conclusion will examine how shale gas and LNG advances are 
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reshaping the European-Eurasian gas market and highlight critical policy choices facing 
the EU, Russia, and Caspian hydrocarbon states.    
A. SHALE GAS: FRACTURING THE CONVENTIONAL GAS MARKET  
1. Overview and Global Impact 
U.S. shale gas extraction has created an almost fanatical response from 
proponents and opponents alike; however, the dynamic impact of this new innovation 
merits a cogent analysis of the U.S. “shale gas revolution” and its implications on gas 
markets around the world. Although knowledge of shale gas is not new, the technology 
required to extract this energy source in economically viable quantities has only been 
available since 2000. Since then, U.S. shale gas extraction continued to rise, and in 2010 
production reached over 10 billion cubic feet/day.146  Additionally, the IEA projected 
U.S. shale gas extraction would double from 2010 through 2030—exceeding 50 percent 
of U.S. domestic gas production and comprising 25 percent of the U.S. energy mix.147  
Yet, this bountiful energy source is technically arduous to extract. To release shale gas, 
trapped in subterranean rock, the source rock must be fractured by pumping fluid and 
abrasive materials, often sand, to crack the rock. The high pressure fluid must also hold 
these fissures open while the wellbore delves into the shale rock to extract the gas. This 
extraction method, known as hydraulic fracturing or “fracking,” must discharge the 
pumping fluid at 8,000 psi and can crack shale rock up to 3,000 feet in all directions from 
the wellbore.148  The hydraulic fracturing process has been refined in U.S. shale fields or 
“plays,” which enabled shale gas to become a viable and valuable energy source in the 
United States and North America. 
Domestic shale gas development has benefitted the U.S. energy market despite 
the 2008 global economic downturn. Even though forty percent of U.S. conventional 
natural gas rigs have shut down since 2008, U.S. natural gas production continued to 
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increase through 2010. Thus, shale gas extraction offset decreased conventional gas 
production.149   Increased natural gas production lowered domestic gas prices and 
consumers’ electric bills. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) the 2011 average well-head price of shale gas was $3.95 per thousand cubic feet, 
and prices in February 2012 dropped to $2.45 per thousand cubic feet.150  Domestic shale 
gas production detached the United States from the global natural gas pricing system 
pegged to oil prices, which resulted in lower U.S. rates than Europe’s long-term contracts 
and interconnector spot prices.151  Additionally, growth in the shale gas market has 
stimulated other U.S. sectors like the petrochemical industry.152  The U.S. is preparing to 
develop its LNG export facilities as well. In 2012, eight LNG projects were proposed to 
export 15.5 billion cubic feet per day. The U.S. Department of Energy has already 
approved one of these export projects.153     
U.S. shale gas production has not only benefited the U.S. market, but has also 
significantly impacted regional markets across the globe—especially in Europe. As the 
United States decreased LNG imports through 2010, gas shipments were redirected from 
Middle Eastern exporters to European and Asian markets and affected prices in both 
regions. Diverting LNG not only provided an alternative to Russian energy in Europe, but 
created economic benefits as well.154  Instead of purchasing natural gas from Russia—
linked to oil-prices—European customers have been able to purchase a portion of their 
energy mix at lower, competitive spot prices. If shale gas production proves economically 
viable in Europe, then competitive natural gas pricing may not be an aberration in energy 
relations, but the normal pricing mechanism.155  Despite positive market results, shale 
gas’s most significant global impact is its ramification for energy security policies.   
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 World shale gas resources: 2011 EIA initial assessment156 Figure 3. 
Increased shale gas production has the potential to become a cornerstone of global 
energy security. New shale gas reserves are redefining the haves and have-nots 
concerning hydrocarbon assets. According to a 2011 EIA survey of global shale gas 
resources, “adding the identified shale gas resources to other gas resources increases total 
world technically recoverable gas resources by over 40 percent.”157  In addition to almost 
doubling the technically recoverable global gas sources, several European nations—that 
have little to no conventional gas assets—are positioned to benefit from the shale gas 
innovation. During a 2011 study, the EIA identified a grouping of seven countries where 
shale gas investment would be most attractive. Of the seven nations in this grouping, four 
are in Europe: France, Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine. These states are positively situated 
for shale gas investment because they are heavily reliant on natural gas imports, have 
some gas production infrastructure, and possess substantial shale gas resources to 
improve self-sufficiency in relation to their gas consumption.158  Yet, shale gas 
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investment could benefit more than this handful of European states; European shale gas 
deposits have the potential to redefine Eurasian energy dynamics. Russia often subsidizes 
prices in exchange for political influence or control of pipeline infrastructure. Because 
Ukraine and Turkey are key transit states for Russian and Caspian energy, their increased 
energy independence could foster discriminatory pricing in Europe and transparent 
energy relations. Shale gas development could pull FSU members of the EU further away 
from Russian influence. According to Kenneth Medlock, Energy and Resource 
Economics Fellow at the Baker Institute, if European nations develop their shale gas 
resources, Russia’s share of the FSU gas market could decrease from twenty-six percent 
to below thirteen percent.159  Moreover, Poland and other FSU states’ isolation in the 
wake of the Russo-German Nord Stream pipeline could be lessened through domestic 
energy production. The potential to alter energy dynamics is echoed in markets around 
the globe. 
Increasing world shale gas production may also increase global energy security by 
preventing the development of a global natural gas exporters’ union. Prior to recent shale 
gas analyses, Russia and Iran were expected to possess over fifty percent of future global 
gas reserves.160  Medlock predicts that shale gas production—outside of the United 
States—could reduce Russia’s, Iran’s, and Venezuela’s hold on the gas market from 
thirty-three percent to below twenty-six percent through 2040.161  If these three exporters 
control only a quarter of global gas trade, they will not possess significant market share to 
form a cartel without economic backlash from customers selecting other energy 
providers.162  Consequently, the potential for increased energy security vis-à-vis 
unscrupulous gas exporters, like Russia, and the tangible impact of U.S. shale gas 
production on global natural gas prices has invigorated interest in European shale gas 
exploration.   
                                                 
159 Medlock, Shale Gas and U.S. National Security, 24. 
160 Ibid., 28. 
161 Ibid., 13. 
162 Moran, “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of Foreign 
Dependence,” 80. 
 50 
2. Hurdles to Shale Gas Extraction 
While there are significant advantages to developing European shale resources, 
several noteworthy obstacles may preclude extracting this energy asset—namely 
environmental, economic, and regulatory/public acceptance challenges. These 
impediments will be examined in turn. The most publicized concern for shale gas 
exploration is the environmental impact of fracking on the ecosystems and communities 
surrounding drill sites. After fracking is complete, the “flow back” water—containing 
dissolved rock particles and chemicals—must be disposed of at a separate location or 
treated before returned to surface waters. Although the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) affirmed fracking did not affect drinking water, residents and local bodies 
remained concerned with the ecological effects of shale gas. Several Colorado residents 
affirmed that fracking had tainted their ground-water wells. Additionally, Pennsylvania 
state regulators have penalized a single company for contaminating the drinking wells of 
fourteen nearby homes with spills of chemical additives, and spills that contaminated a 
local wetland.163  Congress responded to public concerns by urging the EPA to complete 
another study. The EPA’s updated examination will be completed in 2014. Consequently, 
the EPA has created guidance for fracking, but this method is still exempt from the Safe 
Water Drinking Act.164 In addition to contaminated ground water, gas contamination is a 
concern as well. Texas regulators have tested the air surrounding shale gas rigs and 
processing plants for carcinogenic gases. As a result of these contamination fears, New 
Jersey and Vermont have implemented bans on shale gas drilling and New York State has 
established a moratorium on issuing new drilling permits and placed the Delaware 
River—supplying 17 million people with drinking water—off-limits to drilling until the 
updated EPA study is released.165   
Another water related worry is the amount of water consumed during hydraulic 
fracturing. For example the Barnett shale wells, in Texas, required and average of 
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250,000 gallons of water to drill a well and 3.8 million gallons to horizontally fracture 
shale rock.166 Despite this excessive appearance, shale gas extraction requires less water 
than many other energy sources. In order to extract shale gas, an average of 1.47 gallons 
of water is used per one million British Thermal Units (MMBTU) of energy. This 
requirement is far less than the extraction that coal (17 gal/MMTBU), oil (18.5 
gal/MMBTU), or biofuel (2,500 gal/MMBTU) requires.167  Still, water consumption is a 
likely concern in arid climates or remote regions where water must be trucked to drill 
sites. A final environmental concern is the possible relationship between fracking and 
seismic activity. In Ohio, the Department of Natural Resources affirmed that twelve 
“seismic events” in the state were linked to human activity—namely the reinjection of 
flow back water into the shale wells, but not from the fracturing process itself. There 
have also been suspected links between shale gas extraction and earthquakes in Arkansas 
and Oklahoma. Great Britain has implemented a system to overcome this obstacle—shale 
gas exploration must halt in the event of a seismic event of 0.5 on the Richter scale and 
will remain at a halt until tests are conducted and the government deems it is safe to 
proceed.168  Even if the environmental concerns can be overcome, shale gas must still be 
an economically viable resource for European energy companies. 
Europe will not embark upon significant shale gas exploration, unless this process 
is economically viable with existing technology. One economic hurdle concerning shale 
gas is “decline rates” on shale wells that diminish faster than conventional wells. For 
example, the Barnett well in the United States declined in production by thirty-nine 
percent from the first through the second year and by fifty percent from the second to 
third year.169  To continue producing economically viable shale gas, drilling companies 
consistently “tune in” their equipment and techniques to extract more gas—at a lower 
cost—in a given area. This adjustment process allows companies to improve production 
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rates, reduce costs, and improve profitably despite declining well outputs.170  The 
greatest economic risk facing prospective shale gas investment is the substantial time and 
monetary resources companies often expend in sub-economic areas before identifying the 
most favorable wells. To offset this possibility, extensive European surveying is taking 
place—especially in Poland.171  Although European companies can benefit from U.S. 
experience and investment, no two shale gas fields are the same. Consequently, drilling 
techniques must be fine-tuned to each shale play.172  European shale fields may not be 
able to replicate the profits and decreased energy prices that North American shale plays 
have produced. Europe’s shale resources are often smaller and deeper than U.S. plays, 
which will likely require a more complex drilling technique and increased drilling 
costs.173  Another key factor that separates U.S. and European markets is the regulator 
and public acceptance environment. 
U.S. shale gas exploration has been successful due to a combination of new 
technology and advantageous state regulatory laws. Howard Rogers, Director of the 
Natural Gas Research Program at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, asserts the 
greatest challenges to European shale gas development are the European regulatory 
regime and public acceptance.174  For example, the EU’s energy policies and its goal to 
significantly diminish the amount of fossil fuels used by 2020 support investment in 
renewable energies over natural gas. Similarly, France favors nuclear energy over 
investment in natural gas. Thus, European policy may reduce demand for natural gas, 
which could hamper shale investment.175  Yet, the most striking regulatory divergence 
between U.S. and European energy markets is unbundled transport capacity of pipeline 
infrastructure. If the U.S. market did not unbundle transport capacity rights from 
pipelines owners, many small firms would not have been able to bid for pipeline capacity 
and would not have begun extracting shale gas because their product would never has 
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reached the market. Thus, European companies’ monopolistic control of energy 
infrastructure precludes the involvement of smaller firms that could specialize in the 
extraction of shale resources.176  Europe’s regulatory regime may not only inhibit 
industry support, but public acceptance as well. 
The most significant U.S. regulatory boost to shale gas is that American land 
owners have rights to minerals beneath their property and can also negotiate with private 
companies for access to these resources—in compliance with established laws.177  Even 
though American citizens directly benefit from shale gas extraction through payment for 
access to land or indirectly through significantly lower gas prices, American “nimbyism” 
or “not in my backyard” mentality is still present due to environmental concerns 
examined above.178  In Europe, policies are not only more environmentally conscious, 
but hydrocarbon access is also largely controlled by the state. Thus, there is little 
incentive for local residents to support shale exploration if they do not directly benefit 
from this extraction.179  Moreover, citizens, environmental groups and Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) have placed significant pressure on European 
governments to ban shale gas extraction. Consequently, Bulgaria and France have placed 
moratoria on fracking; however, Britain continues to carefully explore this energy 
source.180  Even though it appears that shale gas exploration may never reach fruition in 
Europe, European shale gas production still shows noteworthy potential.  
3. Prospects for European Extraction 
European governments and private companies have shown interest in extracting 
shale gas resources. EU companies, Statoil and Total, have both entered joint ventures 
with U.S. firms to import fracking technology to Europe.181  UK-Danish company Royal 
Dutch Shell, France’s Total SA, and U.S. energy firm Conoco-Philips have all acquired 
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rights to explore shale gas in Poland. Additionally, TNK-BP, a joint-company of BP and 
Russian investors, has pledge $1.8 million to invest in Ukraine’s shale projects. Italy’s 
Eni SpA and U.S. Chevron Corp have already invested in western Ukrainian shale gas. 
The Chevron corps has also acquired more than 6,250 square kilometers of potential 
shale gas fields in Central Europe since 2009.182  Polish leaders have touted shale gas’s 
potential for increased profits, lower energy costs, and energy independence from 
Russia.183  Additionally, there is active research into shale potential in Austria, Croatia 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United 
Kingdom.184  The EIA’s 2011 assessment of world shale gas deposits affirmed that 
Europe contains 639 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of technically recoverable shale gas, which is 
a significant resource when compared to its conventional natural gas reserves of 186 
tcf—including Norway. Furthermore, forty percent of these shale gas reserves are located 
in Europe’s Former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states.185  Thus, shale gas is a possible avenue 
to bolster European energy security by decreasing import dependency.186  Even though 
EU member states are particularly interested in reducing dependence on Russian energy, 
shale gas proponents must overcome environmental, public acceptance, and economic 
hurdles. 
Because European policy makers can use the U.S. shale gas experience as a case 
study, regulators and politicians are unlikely to support fracking without comprehensive 
proof that environmental impacts can be minimized. Once the U.S. EPA’s analysis of 
fracking’s effects on drinking water is complete in 2014, European investment is likely to 
move forward based on the results.187 Several recent U.S. studies have shown that 
environmental contamination related to shale extraction has been caused by poor 
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adherence to existing regulations—not the employment of fracturing technology.188  
Additionally, the UK’s Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering published 
research findings in 2012 that affirmed, “The health, safety, and environmental risks 
associated with hydraulic fracturing…as a means to extract shale gas can be managed 
effectively in the UK as long as operational best practices are implemented and enforced 
through regulation.”189  Thus, increased regulations or government surveillance is the 
likely outcome of pending environmental studies. For example, the “Fracking Act” is 
currently being drafted in the U.S. Congress to ensure that companies openly disclose all 
chemicals used during shale gas drilling. These measures should bolster public 
acceptance, but will also result in cost increases.190  Because EU member states are less 
likely to provide exemptions from environmental legislation, European shale gas 
investors and industry leaders will likely be at the forefront of stimulating public 
acceptance. 
In the United States, the shale gas industry has responded to environmental 
concerns and declining public support by committing to responsible stewardship of 
environmental resources. Although the “Fracking Act” is pending Congressional 
approval, companies have already begun campaigns of transparency and community 
engagement. According to Frank Verrastro, Director of the Energy and National Security 
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Smarter, safer, cleaner is 
now an operational necessity.”191  Yet, Paul Stevens, Senior Research Fellow for Energy 
at Chatham House, believes European shale proponents are unlikely to overcome the 
public’s environmental fears: “If the public has become convinced that shale gas 
operations are bad, then no amount of scientific study or knowledge will counter this.”192 
Despite substantial concerns that European policy makers will not sacrifice political 
capital to support the shale gas industry, several key political factors exist that may 
                                                 
188 Stevens, “The ‘Shale Gas Revolution,’” 6. 
189 Ibid., 8. 
190 Rogers, “Shale Gas-The Unfolding Story,” 135; Stevens, “The ‘Shale Gas Revolution,’” 5. 
191 Verrastro, “The Role of Unconventional Oil and Gas,” 68. 
192 Stevens, “The ‘Shale Gas Revolution,’” 8. 
 56 
encourage European leaders to persuade public opinion.193  First, the EU does not have a 
unified shale gas policy; therefore, popular support for fracking will likely vary 
depending on the size of a nation’s shale gas deposits and their reliance on Russian 
gas.194  Poland is a prime candidate for shale gas extraction due to its reliance on Russian 
energy, stated concern for Russia’s abuse of its market position, and large shale gas 
reserve.   Second, European nations that possess substantial shale gas deposits (France, 
Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK) all have a history of domestic 
oil and gas production; therefore, these states likely have the regulatory apparatus to 
oversee shale gas exploration.195  These nations also currently produce natural gas 
domestically, which should provide shale proponents and policy makers a starting point 
to positively influence local populations through focusing on increased energy 
independence and security.196  Finally, the high cost of Europe’s low-carbon energy 
sources, such as renewables or nuclear energy—which has low popular support after the 
Fukushima Daiichi reactor disaster—offers fertile ground for politicians to support 
natural gas as a short-term domestic alternative to decrease electricity prices.197  
Although, several European nations could garner public support for domestic shale gas 
production, European shale gas extraction will not achieve marketable quantities unless 
fracking proves economically viable. 
Despite Europe’s sufficient regulatory institutions to mitigate environmental 
impact and likely public support from several EU member states, Europe’s natural gas 
market may not support immediate shale gas extraction. Due to low European gas prices 
and a five year production timeline required to develop viable extraction techniques, 
several analysts affirm that Europe will not extract shale gas in substantial quantities (30 
                                                 
193 Ibid., 8. 
194 Rogers, “Shale Gas-The Unfolding Story,” 138. 
195 Ibid. 
196 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Shale Gas Resources.” 
197 Stevens, “The ‘Shale Gas Revolution,’” 3. 
 57 
bcm/year) for several years—possibly after 2020.198  Ian MacDonald, Chevron’s Vice 
President in charge of exploration and production strategy for Europe, Eurasia, and the 
Middle East, estimates it will take another three to five years just to determine if Eastern 
European shale gas deposits are viable.199  Furthermore, Russia’s long-term contracts 
(often extending past 25 years) with most of Eastern Europe render it uneconomical for 
some states to seek alternative energy sources.200  In Poland, one of the most likely shale 
gas producers, demand and infrastructure may prove the greatest economic hurdle. 
Because Poland relies heavily on coal consumption to heat homes, only fifty percent of 
Polish households are connected to natural gas infrastructure. Consequently, there is not 
enough current demand to make shale gas investment economically viable.   Furthermore, 
Poland’s shale gas reserves are located in the north, east, and southeast portions of the 
country, while its pipeline infrastructure is in the southwest.201   Therefore, substantial 
infrastructure investment is required to not only deliver shale gas to domestic consumers, 
but export markets as well. Without viable export routes, private investment in Poland’s 
shale fields is unlikely to materialize in the short term. Still, several analysts affirm that 
shale gas will play a limited role in Europe’s energy security dynamics after 2020.202  
Shale gas will likely provide ten percent of Europe’s domestic energy mix, which enables 
this energy source to serve as “swing product,” but will not create Europe self-
sufficiency.203  Consequently, European nations could increase or decrease shale gas 
production based on market signals—when pricing is profitable or to offset gas 
disruptions. Because large-scale shale production is several years away, many EU 
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member states are still concerned about reliance on natural gas exporters. This import 
dependence may be reduced by increasing European Liquefied Natural Gas investment. 
B. LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS: SECURITY IN LIQUIDITY  
1. Overview and Global Impact 
The EU’s reliance on natural gas imports is anticipated to reach 84 percent by 
2030 as oil and coal continue to be replaced by natural gas. Moreover, natural gas is 
viewed as an efficient energy source to buffer against the unreliability of renewable 
energy and is more palatable than nuclear power.204  This increased use of natural gas 
does not ally European fears of energy insecurity; however, LNG offers an alternative for 
European energy consumers. LNG is not a new form of energy, like shale gas, but a new 
method for delivering natural gas. In order to transport LNG, natural gas must be cooled 
in special facilities to minus 256 degrees Fahrenheit—allowing the gas to condense and 
liquefy. Once natural gas is transformed into a liquid, it can be transported in specialized 
tankers to regasification terminals anywhere in the world. LNG can also be “regasified” 
onboard these vessels and fed directly into natural gas pipelines.205  Although LNG was 
initially utilized to transport natural gas long distances, when pipelines proved 
uneconomical, it has become feasible and economically viable across short distances. For 
example, projects in Cyprus and Lebanon are under construction to import LNG from 
Egypt and Algeria.206  Yet, LNG’s significance is not the mechanical achievement of this 
new transport technology, but its revolutionary impact on gas markets around the globe.   
Liquefied natural gas has begun transforming the natural gas trade from a regional 
market into a global market because LNG exporters can ship natural gas to any country 
that has regasification capabilities. Unlike pipeline gas, geographic proximity does not 
dictate energy relations; LNG can be imported without relying on one’s neighbor for 
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transit or export. LNG accounted for twenty-eight percent of the global gas trade in 2009 
and the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), an independent French 
policy center, estimates LNG production will double by 2020.207  Shale gas has increased 
the importance of LNG because a majority of these new gas producers, including the 
United States, cannot export to Europe via pipelines. LNG technologies enable Europe to 
take advance of a global shale gas boom, even if the EU does not seek full shale 
exploration itself.208  LNG shipments also provide opportunities for natural gas price 
negotiation in contrast to the rigid pipeline system of linking gas to oil prices.209  As a 
result of the U.S. shale gas boom, Middle Eastern and African LNG exports previously 
identified for the United States were shifted to Europe, which resulted in an alternative to 
Russia’s natural gas and pressured Russia to renegotiate its long-term contracts to accept 
lower prices and even index a portion of its gas sales on spot prices instead of oil 
prices.210  Moreover, Gazprom has struggled to compete in Europe with LNG deliveries 
that are sold on spot markets because Russia’s energy monolith is increasingly viewed as 
an unreliable and costlier energy provider.211   As spot pricing increases in the gas market 
and gas delinks from oil prices, gas and oil sources can actually compete in the energy 
market, which is beneficial for European energy consumers.212  Moreover, as LNG 
imports increase, competition among exporters will likely render oil indexing difficult as 
customers will have the opportunity to choose amongst energy providers.213 LNG 
provides physical and market liquidity that can also mitigate price spikes due to regional 
gas disruptions.214  For example, Greece, a nation dependent on Russia for seventy-six 
percent of its gas imports, was able to completely offset gas disruptions during Russia’s 
2009 price dispute with Ukraine by increasing imports via a single LNG regasification 
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terminal.215  Greece also used these LNG imports to supply Bulgaria during the 2009 
dispute.216 In addition to reshaping the natural gas market, LNG has altered energy 
security dynamics as well.  
Liquefied Natural Gas has enabled Europe to blunt Moscow’s energy blackmail 
attacks by diminishing Russia’s market share of European energy imports. In May 2012, 
Europe’s LNG imports primarily originated in Qatar (41 percent), Algeria (22 percent), 
and Nigeria (18 percent).217  IFRI estimates that the EU-27’s LNG consumption will 
increase from sixteen percent to thirty-two percent in 2030.218 Consequently, continued 
LNG investment could reduce Russia’s stake in non-FSU Europe from twenty-seven 
percent in 2009 to thirteen percent by 2040.219 In addition to diversifying energy 
importers, LNG eliminates transit state instability and minimizes regional instability that 
may shutdown pipeline operations like the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Furthermore, LNG 
offers a surge capacity to offset natural disasters or terrorist attacks against conventional 
pipelines instead of leaving citizens subject to the forces of nature, will of terrorists, or 
whims of fickle energy providers.220  Despite the apparent benefits of European LNG 
investment, these positive impacts may dissipate if LNG development stymies due to 
political, economic, or security constraints on future LNG investment.  
2. Obstacles to Investment 
Energy investment is inexorably linked to domestic and foreign politics; LNG is 
no different. European nations may be wary of increasing investment in LNG 
regasification terminals because increased reliance on LNG exporters may limit the EU’s 
ability to denounce human rights violations and undemocratic practices in these nations. 
Most LNG exporters are not democracies and do not share Europe’s free market values. 
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Thus, LNG exporters may deny Europe gas imports if EU member states’ principles or 
actions incense an authoritarian export nation.221  While the 1973 oil embargo may seem 
a tempting example of this fear, a gas-OPEC has yet to form that could employ such an 
embargo. Furthermore, Europe’s inaction during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war illustrates 
that political constraint through pipeline energy relations is no less threatening than 
potential constraints from LNG imports.222  At the domestic level, European citizens may 
not support increased LNG facility construction near their homes. Even U.S. citizens, a 
public that often supports energy independence, displayed nimbyism during site surveys 
for future LNG terminals.223  This concern was overcome in the United States through 
the use of offshore regasification terminals. Public acceptance fears appear to be the least 
significant drawback to LNG investment; yet, some EU politicians question the utility of 
increasing LNG import terminals.224   
European capitals, including Berlin, doubt moving forward on LNG investment 
because LNG regasification hubs currently exceed liquefaction capabilities in export 
nations. Moreover, increased natural gas consumption in Asia, especially China, point to 
issues in security of supply.225  According to Kari Liuhto, Director of the Pan-European 
Institute, increasing Europe’s LNG regasification facilities assumes increased LNG 
exports from Iran, Iraq, and Qatar—all states that favor the Groningen price system 
(linked to oil prices) via pipeline deliveries over the price instability of LNG spot 
markets.226  Furthermore, Iran and Iraq could provide natural gas to China without 
developing LNG capabilities by linking into the pipeline from Turkmenistan to China. In 
addition to security of supply, physical security is another concern. Although LNG is not 
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flammable or volatile, it vaporizes quickly into methane, which is highly explosive. Thus, 
terrorists may target regasification sites to create methane vapor clouds that ignite easily. 
Furthermore, LNG tankers may become terrorist targets because these vessels are easily 
distinguishable from other merchant ships, an attack on an LNG vessel would seriously 
impact import economies and citizens, and gas prices would increase to the benefit of gas 
export nations—some of which have sponsored terrorist organizations in the past.227  
Although the threat of terrorism is the most high profile risk, it can be significantly 
mitigated through maritime security and port security measures that are already in place 
in most the world’s ports and heavily traveled maritime trade corridors. Additionally, 
many U.S. terminals have been built offshore to reduce the population impact of a 
terrorist attack or industrial accident.228  Although combating energy security risks are 
important to the European citizens, increased LNG production will not come to fruition 
unless this delivery method is economically viable.      
The most significant hindrance to increased LNG development is securing 
adequate funding. LNG terminals and transport systems are capital intensive in 
comparison to pipeline networks.229  For example, a proposed LNG supply chain from 
Egypt to Cartagena, Spain (2,735 km) will require $1.6 million in investment for two 
tankers, a liquefaction terminal, and regasification terminal. This estimate does not 
include upstream infrastructure investment to transport natural gas to the liquefaction 
terminal. This project is expected to provide 4.8 bcm/year of natural gas at a cost of 
$2.56/MMBTU. A similar pipeline project, the MEDGAZ from Algeria to Spain, began 
providing 8 bcm/year in March 2011 via an undersea conduit at a total cost of $1.2 
million, including upstream investment, or $1.46/MMBTU.230  In addition to production 
costs, the manpower required to crew an LNG vessel may not be able to keep up with 
transport demand. Each LNG ship requires seventy specially-trained crewmembers at full 
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strength.231   Another hindrance to investment is the likely decoupling of gas from oil 
prices as global LNG deliveries increase. LNG spot markets do not support price stability 
or security of demand that energy exporters desire. Unstable gas prices may not support 
financing large projects to tap new natural gas fields.232  Still, LNG technologies and 
transport costs are projected to decrease through 2020 to include a twenty percent 
reduction in the cost of liquefaction plant construction and a technological improvement 
to increase the size and double the transport capabilities of tankers while reducing their 
production costs by ten percent. Additionally, construction times are likely to decrease 
from five years to four years for a mature LNG supply chain.233  These projected 
decreases in LNG production costs and anticipated increases in global LNG demand bode 
well for LNG investment.   
3. Prospects for European LNG Expansion 
European LNG imports are a significant portion of the world LNG market and 
poised to grow. Natural gas consumption in Europe will almost certainly increase as most 
Eastern European EU member states, struggling to meet the 2020 renewable energy goals 
(twenty percent of domestic energy provided by renewables) will likely focus on 
importing inexpensive energy. To mesh their low-cost energy desires with the EU’s 
environmental values, most Eastern European states will substitute coal consumption 
with natural gas.234  In 2010, LNG comprised one-sixth of Europe’s gas imports and 
Europe’s imports totaled one-third of the global LNG market. Europe’s twenty-one 
existing LNG terminals provide 191 bcm/year capacity. Additionally, thirty-four facilities 
are planned or under construction. If these import sites are completed, Europe could 
increase LNG capacity to 417 bcm/year by 2020. Consequently, 75 percent of Europe’s 
natural gas imports could be supported via LNG.235  Conservative analysts predict 
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Europe will double its capacity—due to economic and policy constraints—to 380 
bcm/year, which still provides a significant majority of Europe’s future gas imports.236  
LNG’s growth potential may enable Europe to move beyond the status quo in energy 
relations and security policies. 
 
  Current and planned European LNG infrastructure237 Figure 4. 
LNG is currently viewed as a means to ease European import dependency on 
Russia in exchange for higher energy costs. For example, Poland and the Baltic States, 
with EUR80 million support from the EU’s European Energy Program for Recovery, 
have begun constructing the Świnoujście LNG terminal in Poland even though this 
enterprise may not be economically profitable. This project will likely reach completion 
because LNG is a significant boon to Eastern European energy security vis-à-vis 
Russia.238  Yet, pipeline gas is less expensive; even though it comes with the possibility 
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of Russian energy blackmail or gas shutoffs.239  Thus, some analysts foresee LNG merely 
serving as a backup energy source or insurance policy, but not a dynamic future 
resource.240  Even as a buffer energy source, LNG has the potential to innovate the 
Eurasian gas market.  
The most significant impact of LNG imports to Europe is that old patterns of 
energy dependence are weakened, if not shattered. As European states develop LNG 
terminals, they are no longer forced to rely on unreliable pipeline energy exporters or 
unstable transit states.241  In 2005, the European Council issued a communique in 2005 
that supported increasing LNG shipments to diversify energy supplies, support growing 
EU gas demand, but most importantly, to use LNG to facilitate gas-gas competition via 
pipelines from Russia and regional natural gas interconnectors.242  Therefore, LNG 
development in Europe will likely not only mitigate dependence on Russia, but facilitate 
natural gas price competition as well.243  Additionally, Russian gas companies may not 
be able to support increased European gas consumption due to ineffective management 
and lack of investment in new gas fields. Consequently, natural gas imports will be 
required from more remote locations—enabling LNG to be truly competitive with future 
long-distance pipeline construction.244  Nevertheless, European regasification capabilities 
are not evenly distributed within the continent, and a significant east/west divide is 
evident. LNG imports sites are predominately in Western Europe. Spain is the largest 
LNG consumer in Europe and Italy has had fourteen LNG terminals under construction 
since 2009. Conversely, Germany has no LNG terminals and only one planned for 
construction. Of the twenty existing terminals and six more under construction, Poland’s 
facility is the only terminal located in an EU member state that is almost completely 
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reliant on Russian energy.245  This disparity highlights the vulnerability of Eastern 
Europe to Russia in contrast to Western Europe’s apparent energy security. Yet, the 
current lack of LNG terminals in Eastern Europe does not consign these states to Russian 
domination. LNG imports to Western Europe can still bolster Eastern European energy 
security—if the EU develops policies and energy infrastructure to support an internal 
European market.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The fanfare surrounding global shale gas resources may not result in a shale gas 
boom in Europe; however, this energy source will still play a role in Europe’s future 
energy mix. Despite the substantial shale resources in Europe and its potential to 
significantly reduce Europe’s energy dependence, the environmental, technological and 
economic, and regulatory/public acceptance challenges facing the shale industry will 
likely prevent wide spread extraction in Europe. Yet, the lack of EU policy concerning 
hydraulic fracturing technologies allows EU member states maneuver room to explore 
their own domestic energy policies and environmental regulations. United Kingdom 
policy supporting shale extraction and its efforts to minimize environmental impacts bode 
well for future British shale development. Additionally, the Polish government’s strong 
support for energy independence and private investment in the Polish shale industry by 
several American and European firms illustrate the likelihood of significant shale 
extraction in Poland. Moreover, heavy investment into Ukraine’s shale gas capabilities is 
ongoing. Despite British, Polish, and Ukrainian extraction potential, shale gas will likely 
serve as a swing energy source for most of Europe—providing buffers against import 
disruptions. Shale gas production in a few European nations is still several years away, 
which leaves the specter of import dependence looming in most European capitals. Even 
if the EU does not seek full-scale shale gas exploration, LNG technologies enable Europe 
to take advantage of the U.S. shale gas boom via increased gas imports from the Middle 
East and Africa that were previously designated for the United States. 
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LNG is the likely unconventional energy technology that will revolutionize 
European-Eurasian energy security dynamics. Liquefied Natural Gas has already served 
as insurance against gas disruptions, including during the 2009 Russo-Ukrainian energy 
disputes. Europe’s twenty-one LNG terminals will be augmented shortly by the 
expansion of three existing facilities and construction of six new terminals within the 
next four years. Furthermore, eleven terminals are scheduled for expansion and twenty-
eight new LNG import sites are planned for future development. If these terminals are 
completed, European LNG import capacity will reach 417 bcm—seventy-five percent of 
the EU’s natural gas imports. Although the most significant hindrance to increased LNG 
development is securing adequate funding, the EU’s EUR80 million investment for 
Poland’s Świnoujście LNG facility is a strong display of European political will despite 
concerns about the project’s economic profitability. Furthermore, LNG technologies, 
construction timelines, and transport costs are expected to continue decreasing, while 
transport capacity and productivity are predicted to increase through 2020. LNG’s 
ramifications extend beyond technological achievements and have the potential to 
significantly alter Europe’s energy market. 
Increased LNG imports should create competition among exporters, which 
habitually lowers prices to slightly above production costs. Thus, additional natural gas 
supplies will likely compel pipeline exporters to sell a portion of their natural gas at spot 
prices instead of the Groningen oil index. Furthermore, increased EU natural gas will 
likely require gas from more remote locations, which will enable LNG to become even 
more competitive with future long-distance pipelines. Consequently, energy providers 
that feed long-distance pipelines may have to accept spot pricing as the new normal to 
complete with LNG in the globalizing gas marketplace. Still, the most significant impact 
of LNG imports to Europe is that old patterns of energy dependence are weakened. As 
European states build LNG terminals, Russia’s dominance over energy exports will 
continue to diminish. Liquefied Natural Gas has enabled Europe to blunt Moscow’s 
energy blackmail attacks by diminishing Russia’s market share of European energy 
imports and its ability to disrupt domestic markets as seen in Greece’s ability to provide 
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natural gas to itself and in Bulgaria during the 2009 Russo-Ukrainian energy disputes. 
Yet, the location of Europe’s LNG terminals raises some concerns.   
Although several LNG terminals are planned in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea 
littorals of Eastern European nations, Poland is the only state dependent on Russian gas 
that will have a terminal in the near term. The disparity in the LNG import capacity may 
appear to condemn Eastern Europe to Russia’s fickle energy policies, but LNG terminals 
in Western Europe can still bolster Eastern European energy security if the EU develops 
policies and energy infrastructure to support an internal European market. The 
importance of EU energy policy in reaction to European unconventional gas investments, 
including LNG terminals, will be examined in the next chapter. However, EU member 
states are not the only nations at a crossroad. Moscow’s objection to transparency and 
adhering to EU regulations remains stalwart, but unconventional natural gas has provided 
Europe with an energy alternative. This shift in Eurasian energy dynamics warrants 
exploring Russia’s political will and ability to adapt and the policy implications for 
energy exporting nations in the Caspian region as well.   
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTERED ENERGY 
BRIDGE 
Liquefied Natural Gas has already altered Eurasian energy dynamics. Russia no 
longer holds a monopolistic position in EU gas imports and its power to form a gas cartel 
has been severely limited; EU member states continue to diversify gas imports with 21 
operational LNG terminals and 34 terminals planned or under construction; and 
diminished European demand for Caspian gas has facilitated a shift of Central Asian 
energy to China. Yet, the emergence of unconventional gas technologies does not render 
energy diplomacy obsolete. According to Daniel Yergin, government policy, not 
extractive capability, is the most critical factor for ensuring energy security.246  
Therefore, this chapter will examine the internal and external policy implications of the 
changes to Eurasia’s Energy Bridge. This chapter will initially assess the impacts of LNG 
and shale gas on Russia’s domestic energy industry and how an emerging international 
gas market will alter Russia’s relations with Europe, the Caspian Basin, and China. I will 
then explore the future of the Caspian region, which is traditionally viewed as key to 
energy security. European LNG imports not only impact the Caspian nations’ relations 
with the West, but will likely influence internal politics as well. Finally, this chapter will 
examine how natural gas innovations provide a significant incentive for EU internal 
market integration, which will lead to an investigation of future energy relations between 
the EU, Russia, and the Caspian hydrocarbon states.  
A. RUSSIA: WILL MOSCOW GRIN AND BEAR IT? 
1. Internal Policies  
President Putin’s July 2012 speech to Russia’s ambassadors touted economic 
power as the source of Russia’s strength in foreign relations; it is the same in domestic 
politics.247  Russia’s political elite understand that hydrocarbon funds are key to 
economic stability and political popularity. Oil and gas exports currently support one-
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third of Russia’s annual budget.248  Therefore, economic prosperity and political stability 
depend on exporting hydrocarbons to Europe at high prices. This economic dynamic may 
provide a partial explanation for the Kremlin’s strategy to consolidate hydrocarbon 
exporters into monopolistic corporations, like Gazprom, which controls ninety percent of 
Russia’s gas exports. Yet, the EU’s move to diversify imports through LNG erodes 
Russia’s ability to demand high prices and long-term contracts. The possible extraction of 
shale gas by a handful of member states, especially Poland, exacerbates this problem. 
Consequently, future European gas prices may drop to half of the current oil-linked 
prices. Thus, a central girder of Russia’s domestic stability is weakening and a substantial 
income stream for Russia’s ruling elite is in jeopardy.249   
 Russia’s industry leaders, politicians, and criminal entrepreneurs have utilized the 
energy sector to launder illicit profits while enriching high-level elites. The corrupt 
management of Gazprom has rendered it economically stagnant. Gazprom pays twice the 
global average construction cost to build its pipeline projects, and fifty percent of the 
funds Gazprom invests in development simply disappear.250  In 2008, Gazprom’s 
corruption and waste totaled $40 billion, while its annual profits were only $44.7 billion. 
Moreover, Gazprom’s persistent utilization of intermediary companies is likely driven by 
rent-seeking activities. Russia’s political elites and criminal entrepreneurs have 
developed a network of dummy corporations to build trans-national alliance with the aim 
of laundering illicit profits, while enriching high-level elites. By 2008, Gazprom had 
established fifty intermediary companies with the consent of political elites. 
Intermediaries serve little practical purpose in the energy trade; they do not own or 
operate pipeline infrastructure or expedite products and payments. These practices have 
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led some economic analysts to liken Gazprom to a crime syndicate funneling profits to its 
bosses.251  Simply put, Russia’s energy sector is poorly managed, corrupt, and 
weakening. 
Gazprom’s decision to cancel development of the Shtokman field in the Barents 
Sea is one indication of Russia’s weak energy sector.252  While the uncertainty in the 
European market plays some part in this decision, the lack of energy profitability in the 
domestic market, due to price subsidies, may be the greatest obstacle to new 
investment.253  In addition to the need for new field development, much of Russia’s gas 
infrastructure is a remnant of the Soviet pipeline system—in need of replacement.254  In 
the light of Russia’s waning energy sector, the opportunity for bold changes in the 
domestic market is ripe. Rent seeking will no longer support increased Russian living 
standards or competiveness in the globalizing gas market. Gazprom’s inefficiency and 
corruption are unlikely to be remedied, but the company could be separated into several 
medium-sized, private companies. Small corporations have been successful in Russia’s 
oil industry and these firms may be able to exploit the large gas fields that Gazprom has 
been unable to develop.255 Instead of subsidizing energy prices to bolster living 
standards, the Kremlin could deregulate energy and gas sectors to enable Russian 
business to use energy more efficiently and compete domestically and internationally. 
Additionally, commitment to the Kremlin’s timeline for removing energy subsidy better 
position gas firms to make profits in the domestic market, which would increase the 
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likelihood of infrastructure overhaul or investment—if private enterprises exist in the 
energy sector.256  Although these changes to the domestic market may appear lofty, 
Russian leaders seem to grasp their dire reliance on the hydrocarbon industry. Yet, they 
will have to contend with the Kremlin to reform the energy sector. 
Russian political elites have voiced support for improving the domestic energy 
market. Both President Medvedev and Putin affirmed that economic modernization is the 
key to reducing Russia’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports.257  To codify this political 
objective, the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation stated in the Energy Strategy 
of Russia for the period up to 2030, “The main objective of the Strategy is to set up 
innovative and efficient energy sector in Russia meeting the energy needs of a growing 
economy, as well as the foreign economic interests of the country.”258  In order to 
achieve this goal, the Ministry of Energy proposed: developing a competitive market 
environment, establishing a “stable institutional environment within the energy sector,” 
improving energy efficiency in the Russian economy, and shifting economic reliance 
from hydrocarbons exports to high-technology production.259 Although political elites 
understand the issues facing the energy sector and required solutions, Russian power 
brokers may prevent these necessary reforms. 
Despite identifying the critical need to transform the Russian economy, Moscow’s 
political will appears to be weak. The stagnation of Russia’s energy sector would seem to 
be a significant catalyst for transition to free market principles—listed as a necessary 
solution by the Energy Ministry, but Russian leaders, going back to the Tsars, have 
historically preferred delegating authority over realms of the empire in exchange for 
money, reward, or political support.260  Putin has had over a decade to recover from 
Yeltsin’s kleptocratic systems, but he has merely installed a new version of rent seeking 
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through Kremlin control of “strategic” industries.261  Rosneft’s October 17, 2012 by-out 
offer for TNK-BP is the most recent example of Kremlin consolidation. This deal was so 
significant that it required the formal approval of Vladimir Putin. If BP accepts Rosneft’s 
offer, the state-backed firm will become the world’s largest oil producer. Furthermore, 
BP will lose its position as the only foreign firm with veto rights in a Russian consortium. 
Rosneft’s purchase of TNK-BP may also prevent BP from entering a consortium to 
explore the artic—further limiting Russia’s development of new energy fields.262  In 
addition to Moscow’s control of the energy sector, actors outside the Kremlin may also 
stymie necessary domestic reforms. Oligarchs in the manufacturing industry will likely 
oppose the removal of energy subsidies, which will raise operating costs and decrease 
their profits.263  Yet, Putin’s imprisonment of Mikhail Khordokovsky—former owner of 
Yukos Oil— in May 2005 has appeared to curb oligarchic protestation. Some observers 
believe the economy’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports may divert Russia from investing 
in human capital and new technologies—including those in the energy field, which will 
force Russia to cope with the industry and technology it currently employs.264  Yet, 
innovations in the gas industry—outside Russia—may be the greatest catalyst for 
transforming the domestic market. 
There are signs that Russia industry leaders can reform. According to Robert 
Peston, BBC News Business Editor, the BP-TNK purchase should be viewed as an 
indication of “Rosneft’s gradual privatization and its ambition to be seen as one of the 
world’s most powerful oil companies.”  The TNK-BP purchase may give BP twenty 
percent share in Rosneft. Consequently, the Russian oil firm will likely have access to 
BP’s trade techniques, technology, management experience, and budgeting methods. 
Moreover, the addition of BP in the Rosneft firm will enable Russia’s oil giant to attract 
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international investors. Exposure to BP’s business practices and a new opportunity to 
attract international investors will likely be an impetus for Rosneft’s managers to remove 
the company from the Kremlin’s grasp.265  Additionally, there are signals that Gazprom 
is preparing for a similar move away from Moscow’s control. Despite decades of 
supporting Russian economic development, the depletion of Gazprom field—with little 
prospect of new development—coupled with lack of profits in the domestic sector and 
high operating costs are a strong incentive for Gazprom to remove itself as a “national 
donor” in order to ensure the company’s survival and profitability.266 Signs of Gazprom’s 
struggle against the Kremlin have manifested themselves in Russian energy disputes. 
Russia’s 2006–2007 energy clashes with Ukraine and Belarus were likely maneuvers to 
gain equity stakes in both nations transit infrastructure—not political disputes. In 2007, 
the Belarusian government was a political ally of the Kremlin; however, Moscow set a 
firm deadline for Belarus to surrender control of transit company, Beltrangaz, or begin 
paying market prices for energy. These early conflicts demonstrate that Russia sought 
control of downstream gas routes and intermediary companies instead of managing 
domestic politics in former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states. Gazprom’s economic goals 
have led Russia into precarious relations with its European customers and may be a 
critical factor in many future policy decisions. Thus, Moscow may make imprudent 
foreign policy choices—such as supporting unstable dictators in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan or aggravating tension with China over competition for energy resources in 
Central Asia—in Gazprom’s search for capital gain.267  Despite Putin’s use of legal and 
extralegal means to influence the hydrocarbon industry and the pervasive corruption in 
the energy sector, powerful lobbies within the energy sector already exist and have 
persistently pushed for internal reforms to decrease energy subsidies and move towards 
liberalizing the energy industry to increase profits, international investment, and 
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competiveness in the world energy market. Moreover, the primary goal of Russian energy 
companies is to make a profit for licit or illicit reasons.268   
2. External Relations 
Gazprom will likely liberalize due to its desire to make profits in the European 
market, if the EU continues to hold foreign companies to their internal standards. The gas 
giant will find it difficult to counter the European Commission’s power to enforce EU 
regulations. Moreover, the European Commission’s raids on Gazprom’s offices last year 
dispelled the belief that ties with the Kremlin would give the company legal immunity.269  
Additionally, Gazprom has begun conforming to EU market regulations and integrating 
into the single energy market. In May 2012, Gazprom’s deputy Chairman Alexander 
Medvedev stated that Lithuania authorities had pressured Gazprom into unbundling its 
pipeline import and transport companies in compliance with EU requirements.270 On 
September 25, 2012, in contrast to Putin’s decree, Alexander Medvedev admitted the 
company is planning on unbundling its European subsidiary companies to comply with 
EU antitrust laws and Third Energy Package.271  Although Gazprom has voiced its 
willingness to comply with EC requirements, the company’s share price has dropped, and 
Gazprom will likely receive fines and incur legal fees that could catalyze spending 
adjustments and improve management techniques to recover lost revenue.272   
Gazprom’s future share of the European gas market will likely be substantially 
reduced due to LNG and shale gas developments. The EU’s planned LNG facilities can 
sustain two-thirds of the EU’s projected gas requirements in 2020.273  LNG and minor 
shale development in Europe will likely erode Russia’s monopolistic footing or preclude 
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the formation of a functional gas cartel. According to U.S. anti-trust policies, if four 
countries or companies control over fifty percent of a certain market, then collusion is 
able to occur without economic backlash. Simply put, the “4/50 rule of thumb” affirms 
cartels cannot exert control if non-cartel providers supply over fifty percent of the 
market.274  Prior to expansion in European LNG imports, Russia’s market position 
appeared uncontestable. In 2009, the EU-27 imported forty-three percent of its natural 
gas from Russia.275  Furthermore, close to four-fifths of the EU-27’s imports of natural 
gas in 2009 came from Russia, Norway, or Algeria.276  Yet, Europe’s LNG imports 
primarily originated in Qatar (forty-one percent), Algeria (twenty-two percent), and 
Nigeria (eighteen percent) by May 2012.277 This expansion in LNG trade has diversified 
Europe’s exports from Russian dominance. Consequently, continued LNG investment 
could reduce Russia’s stake in non-FSU Europe to thirteen percent by 2040.278  Thus, 
Gazprom’s position in the European market will likely continue to weaken and Brussels 
may begin to exert leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. Decreased European demand for Russian 
gas and increased global gas reserves continue to drive down European natural gas spot 
prices, and Gazprom’s oil indexed prices cannot compete with these lower LNG spot 
prices.279   
The Kremlin and Russia’s Energy Ministry understand Russia’s position vis-à-vis 
Europe. Gazprom needs to sell its gas on the European market. Russia’s pipeline system, 
and lack of pipelines to Asia, requires most Russian gas to be sold in the European 
market. Moreover, Russia’s domestic economy and political stability are founding on 
hydrocarbon exports.280  In 2000, before Putin became Russia’s President he declared, 
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“There can be no superpower where weakness and poverty reigns.”281 This affirmation 
was reiterated in Putin’s recent statement that Russian economic strength is its greatest 
tool in foreign policy.282 Russia’s current energy strategy implies that Europe and the 
CIS will remain the primary consumer market through 2030. Consequently, 
“maintenance of Russia’s stable relations with its traditional consumer of energy 
resources and development of equally stable relations on new energy markets will be one 
of the key principles.”283  Therefore, Russian gas cutoffs may not be a sign of political 
control of powerful energy blackmail. The gas-wars in Eastern Europe have not increased 
Moscow’s power, but publicized Gazprom as an unreliable energy provider.284  By 
ceasing gas deliveries to Ukraine in 2009, Russia angered it largest consumer market and 
catalyzed Europe’s drive for energy diversity. According to Andrei Shleifer, Professor of 
Economics at Harvard University, “That the Kremlin had to shoot itself in the foot to get 
Kiev’s attention reveals the limits of its blackmail power.”285  Despite past episodes of 
energy blackmail, bountiful hydrocarbon assets have not guaranteed Russian political 
control in former Soviet and Warsaw pact states. For example,  the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, and Poland—three of the states most dependent on Russian energy—have all 
recently joined NATO, offered to host NATO missile defense, and openly criticized 
Russian policy.286  Gazprom is facing a European gas market—the only market that 
Russian gas companies can make substantial profits—that is diversifying away from 
Russian gas and instituting reforms that will weaken the Kremlin’s ability to demand 
preferential treatment. Moscow’s response to the European Commission’s 2012 antitrust 
case against Gazprom provides an opportune lens to view Russia’s ability to adjust to 
evolving EU-Russian energy dynamics.      
On September 11, 2012, President Putin responded to the European 
Commission’s antitrust investigation of by signing an official decree that forbade 
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“strategic” firms from negotiating or cooperating with “foreign investigations” with 
Moscow’s permission.287  He also commented, “The EU subsidized the economies of 
Eastern European countries…Now it seems someone in the EU has decided to shift part 
of the burden, some of the subsidies, onto us.”288  Thus, Putin’s reactions to the antitrust 
probe display a lack of understanding of market forces and a desire to control Gazprom’s 
integration into a free market system. In addition to the Kremlin decree, some analysts 
believe Moscow has used pricing to punish nations that are moving forward with EU 
market reforms, such as Lithuania and Moldova.289  Consequently, Anders Aslund—
former economic adviser to Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine—believes Gazprom will be 
“headed for the dustbin of history” because the company has become irrevocably state 
controlled and will not conform to the rules of the European market; however, there are 
indicators that Gazprom will survive its row with the European Commission.290  The 
company may have shelved its development of the Shtokman field, but it has recently 
enlarged its trading division in the United Kingdom, completed the second undersea Nord 
Stream pipeline, forecasted South Stream pipeline construction for early 2013, and begun 
studying recoverable shale gas deposits in Russia.291  Gazprom’s managers and investors, 
driven by the desire for profits, will likely strive to keep the company engaged in the 
European market—its only profitable sector. Therefore, it may be a bit early to consign 
Gazprom to strategic irrelevance. Nevertheless, Russia’s diminished leverage in the 
European market have also affected its position in the CIS. 
Russia has traditionally sought control of the energy bridge from Central Asia to 
Europe to shore-up its influence in CIS nations, former Soviet republics, and Europe, but 
decreased European gas demand has propagated a rapid decline in Russia’s gas imports 
from Central Asia.292   Central Asian exports to Russia are predominantly used to meet 
Russia’s domestic energy needs, and Central Asian states have offset declining energy 
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relations with Russia by shifted gas exports to China, which is more desirable to the 
Kremlin than Central Asian gas exporters shipping supplies directly to Europe.293  
Consequently, Russia’s soft power draw and economic influence have waned. Still, some 
analysts believe Russia will maintain its role as the primary military power due to 
China’s non-interventionists policies.294  In the face of declining exports to Europe, 
Russia has contemplated increasing exports to eastern markets (China, Korea, Japan, and 
Taiwan). Russia’s energy ministry asserts that its energy firms must alter their role in the 
international market by diversifying export destinations.295  Yet, current pipeline 
infrastructure cannot support a large-scale shift to the east. Moreover, Russian exports to 
this region may only increase by thirteen percent through 2040, which would give 
Moscow less geopolitical impact than it probably desires.296  Russian energy prospects 
may appear bleak, but the IEA projects that Russia will remain the world’s largest gas 
supplier through 2035.297  This gas will find a market, if it is priced competitively and 
conforms to regulations in consumer nations. Nevertheless, the waning power of Russia’s 
“energy weapon” has repercussion in the Caspian Region and the EU as well.  
B. CASPIAN REGION: FUTURE OF THE “NEW NORTH SEA” 
The Caspian region has traditionally been hailed as a linchpin of European energy 
diversity; however, expansion of unconventional natural gas technologies (shale and 
LNG) has altered the region’s role in Eurasian energy relations.298  After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Europe and the United States anticipated a Caspian boon to the global 
energy market. Some analysts referred to the region as the New North Sea and predicted 
that Caspian exports would provide eight percent of the world’s future oil supply. 
                                                 
293 Denison, “Game Over?” 5; Shleifer, “Why Moscow Says No,” 5. 
294 Henrik Bergsager, “China, Russia and Central Asia: The Energy Dilemma,” FNI Report 16 
(Fridtjof Nanses Institut, September 2012), accessed November 5, 2012, http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-
R1612.pdf, 18; Laruelle, “Russia ‘is a Delicate Matter?’” 4. 
295 Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, “Energy Strategy of Russia,” 23. 
296 Bergsager, “China, Russia and Central Asia,” 6; Medlock, Shale Gas and U.S. National Security, 
47. 
297 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2011, 155. 
298 Mankoff, “Eurasian Energy Security,” 22. 
 80 
Moreover, the region was viewed as a solution to reliance on Middle Eastern oil and its 
geographic position between Asia and Europe made it an essential component of the 
natural gas bridge to Europe.299  Other analysts have tempered these excited forecasts 
with predictions of hydrocarbon shortages leading to intense conflict. For example, 
Michael Klare, U.S. defense policy and oil analyst, believes military confrontation 
between the United States and China over Central Asian energy sources is an emerging 
reality.300  Yet, there is a current oversupply of natural gas in the global market due to 
new technology to extract unconventional gas sources and the globalization of the gas 
market through LNG technology. Russia’s share of Europe’s natural gas market has 
receded due to LNG shipments sold at lower spot prices, which has significantly reduced 
Gazprom’s need for Central Asian gas. Currently, Russia uses natural gas from 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to meet its domestic energy needs.301 Therefore, shale gas 
and LNG have nearly eliminated the threat of intense natural gas competition in the 
Caspian. Although this de-escalation of resource competition may be a positive indicator 
of reduced energy conflicts, the Caspian will likely be irrevocably changed.   
1. External Relations  
After the Soviet era, the diverse South Caucasus and Central Asian littorals were 
often viewed as one region—the Caspian. However, a unified role in energy relations will 
likely never materialize in the Caspian Basin. Despite monetary investment and 
diplomatic endeavors from the EU and United States, Central Asian gas has not been able 
to bridge the Caspian Sea. Nevertheless, a December 2012 Minority Staff Report for the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations proposed leveraging Russia’s weakened 
energy relationship vis-à-vis Europe to reenergize development of the Southern gas 
corridor and support U.S. policy aims to further isolate Iran, foster independence of FSU 
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sates in the Caucuses and Central Asia, and diversify NATO gas sources.302  Yet, 
Azerbaijan is the key center of the Southern gas corridor as the gateway for Central Asian 
gas. In addition to the hurdles to a trans-Caspian pipeline examined in the first chapter of 
this thesis, persistent risk of Caspian maritime conflicts may preclude foreign investment. 
Although Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan recently ended their naval confrontation over 
ownership of the Serdar/Kyapaz gas field in the Caspian, this conflict may resume 
unexpectedly. Additionally, Iran and Azerbaijan could clash over the Sardar Jangal oil 
field in the proximity of their disputed maritime border as they have in the past.303  These 
conflicts render Caspian seabed delineation unlikely, which is pivotal to developing a 
trans-Caspian energy bridge. Most hydrocarbon assets on the western coast (Azerbaijan) 
will likely continue to head to west via the BTE pipeline, while resources from the east 
littorals (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) will continue to be exported north to Russia and 
east to China.304  The BTE and Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipelines have empowered 
Baku to drift from Moscow’s sphere of privileged interest towards the west, and Azeri 
gas is expected to directly link into European markets before 2020.305  Incidentally, 
Turkey may become a more significant player in the Caspian gas market. In 2011, 
Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a bilateral energy deal to construct the Trans-Anatolian 
Pipeline (TANAP). This project is the first forward movement in the Southern gas 
corridor since 2009. This pipeline is projected to deliver sixteen bcm/year of natural gas 
to supply Turkey and Central Europe.306   Thus, Azerbaijan will likely continue to drift 
west.   
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Conversely, Central Asian gas reaches less of the European and Russian markets 
and is increasingly exported to China.307  Central Asian hydrocarbon exporters have 
become adept at playing Russia, China, and Europe against the other to obtain the 
relationship most conducive to Central Asian foreign-policy interests and sovereignty, 
but unconventional gas technologies have reduced the competition for Central Asian gas 
and proximate bargaining power of Central Asian hydrocarbon exporters. Turkey has 
expressed interest in purchasing gas from Turkmenistan; however, a trans-Caspian 
pipeline would be required to deliver this energy supply to the Turkish market. Moreover, 
Azerbaijan is projected to control fifty-one percent of the proposed TANAP conduit to 
Turkey. Therefore, Baku could prevent Turkmen gas from reaching Turkey:  recent and 
historical gas disputes between the two states make this likely.308   
Unconventional natural developments, coupled with a lack of export routes to 
Europe, render China the most attractive customer—possibly the sole customer—for 
Central Asian gas, which could severely limit these republics’ maneuver room in future 
energy negotiations.309  China has successfully utilized a strategy of offsetting Russia’s 
political influence with economic integration through the SCO and energy backed 
loans.310  EU interests in Central Asia will not likely focus on hydrocarbon extraction, 
and Russia’s reduced need for Central Asian energy may result in diminished influence in 
the region.311  Moreover, Russia’s waning impact and China’s non-interventionist 
approach will directly impact Central Asian internal policies. 
2. Internal Policies 
In Central Asia, hydrocarbon profits are often used to enrich and empower ruling 
elites, drive economic development, and maintain sovereignty; yet, unconventional gas 
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developments have altered the motor of this dynamic—great power competition.312  
Michael Denison, former Special Adviser to the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, predicts that the lack of resource competition for Central Asian 
gas will result in energy geopolitics becoming the “local politics of energy.”313 If the 
local politics of energy leads to domestic political upheaval, Central Asian leaders will 
likely have to handle internal challenges on their own. Russia may refuse to intervene due 
to strategic consideration or lack of capabilities; moreover, Moscow’s recent inability to 
follow through on political and investment promises may highlight a lack of commitment 
to the region. China’s economic-driven, non-intervention strategy does not fill the 
vacuum of waning Russian support for Central Asian leaders.314  Therefore, the lack of 
resource competition, has provided Central Asian leaders the greatest sovereignty of all—
freedom to manage domestic policies and responsibility for maintaining domestic 
stability. 
C. EUROPEAN UNION: MARKET LIBERALIZATION—THE CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. Internal Policies  
EU member states have long employed energy nationalism as Gunther 
Oettinger—EU Energy Commissioner—cautioned, “Energy supplies are simply too 
important to view as a national prerogative.”315  Thus, a unified energy market may be 
the “critical infrastructure” to fulfilling EU energy security. Although the 1973 Arab 
Embargo illustrated that national companies do not buffer a state from upstream 
manipulation, European nations have traditionally relied on national champions to foster 
energy security. During this oil crisis, the United Kingdom was still subjected to OPEC 
pressure because BP followed the guidance of OPEC instead of the UK.316 Moreover, 
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large EU energy firms and their patron governments—such as France, Germany, and 
Italy—have stalled efforts to create an internal European energy market.   
LNG innovations may provide the decisive incentive to unify Europe’s energy 
market. This energy source has provided physical liquidity to global markets, enabled EU 
member states to respond to single supply shocks, and lowered gas prices through 
arbitrage with Russia.317  Nevertheless, European LNG terminal often operate at fifty-
percent capacity. This untapped vital infrastructure illuminates an imbalance in the 
internal market. Most EU LNG terminals are in Western Europe, while Eastern European 
member states—most susceptible to energy disruptions—have no LNG terminals to 
diversify supplies. Therefore, LNG imports to the west could be a critical tool to ensure 
energy security in Eastern Europe. Oettinger affirms, “Just take the example of the gas 
crisis in January 2009. If the internal market had been functioning and the necessary 
infrastructure had been in place to transport gas to where it was needed, nobody would 
have had to stay in the cold.”318 Incidentally, this event has spurred EU investment in 
LNG terminals, like the Świnoujście terminal in Poland, and pipeline interconnectors to 
all member states by 2015.319   
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  Baltic and Central-Eastern European Market Interconnection Plans320 Figure 5. 
The EU is well on its way to building an extensive interconnector network in the 
FSU and former Warsaw Pact territory. Poland is currently connected to Germany and 
Belarus through the Laow and Teterovka interconnectors; interconnector pipelines 
already link Hungary with Romania and Croatia; connection pipelines are currently under 
construction from Bulgaria to Romania; Hungary and Slovakia have dedicated funds to 
construct an interconnector by 2015; and Bulgaria will begin another pipeline connection 
to Greece next year. In 2008, the European Commission (EC) listed the interconnection 
of the Baltic Region as one of its six “priority energy infrastructure projects” with the 
goal of integrating the three Baltic States into the European market. This Baltic European 
Market Interconnector Plan requires the construction of 18 pipelines. Two of the 
interconnectors have already been completed. Of the sixteen current projects, only one 
has been delayed due to funding constraints. Moreover, the EC is examining the 
feasibility of building a North-South gas interconnector from the Baltic Sea to the 
Adriatic Sea that is estimated to reduce gas purchase prices by 15 percent compared to 
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2011.321  Despite the apparent success of the EU’s interconnector programs, providing 
political capital for new infrastructure projects should not be Brussels’ primary focus. 
Regulatory framework is the key hurdle to a unified market. 
Instead of expending political will on infrastructure projects (pipelines, LNG 
facilities, storage terminals, and shale extraction), EU energy security may be better 
realized through regulatory action that leverages dynamic unconventional gas resources. 
While European shale gas production has received much media attention, it will not 
sufficiently alter energy dynamics in the short-term and the “shale gas hype” may 
actually reduce member states’ political support for internal market integration. 
Moreover, a European level approach to shale gas exploration that requires transparency 
and monitors environmental impacts will likely be required before large scale European 
shale exploration materializes.322 Yet, national efforts to engage the public on shale gas’s 
merits may not yield significant results, but prioritizing market integration over lobbying 
for specific energy technologies will likely bolster long-term shale gas development. 
Investors will be assured of a more stable and inclusive European gas market.323  Simply 
restated, energy firms are more likely to invest when they are certain their gas will reach 
demanding consumers. For example, North America’s unbundled market structure was a 
critical factor that enabled the U.S. shale gas boom because smaller firms could enter the 
shale gas market with confidence their gas would reach U.S. domestic customers.324  
Moreover, the U.S. shale gas boom has directed greater quantities of LNG to Europe, but 
increased LNG imports to Western Europe does not guarantee EU energy security. 
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Building interconnectors is a step to bridging the east/west gas divide, but 
unifying the European energy market is the most important energy security requirement 
and most likely method to reduce the geopolitical risk of dependence on Russian 
energy.325   The EU’s Third Energy Package, adopted on September 19, 2007, addresses 
the shortfalls of creating an internal gas market. The goal of this legislation was to create 
a competitive gas market—open to all suppliers—through the unbundling of pipeline 
systems, cooperation of national regulators, and investigation of monopolistic 
companies—regardless of national ownership.326  Yet, the EU’s energy directive was 
poorly implemented due to lack of interest and incentive because large European energy 
suppliers utilized long-term pipeline contracts and enjoyed near monopolies in their 
respective domestic markets.327 Moreover, many European energy companies were 
national champions that held sway over their governments through political lobbying. 
Several EU member states with strong energy ties to Russia—Germany, France, and 
Italy—have blocked Brussels’ moves towards market integration for over a decade.328  
Thus, the EU’s goal to complete the internal energy market by 2015 appeared in 
jeopardy; yet, several events indicate a shift in member states’ political will to liberalize 
Europe’s gas market.329  The 2009 Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute galvanized member state 
support—even from Germany—for greater market integration.330  In February 2011, EU 
Heads of States and Governments reaffirmed their commitment to remove all barriers to 
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the internal energy market by 2014.331  Most recently, the EC has begun to enforce the 
Third Energy Package by referring delinquent member states to the EU Court of Justice. 
On October 24, 2012, Slovenia and Poland were both accused of “failing to fully 
transpose the EU internal energy market rules.”  Furthermore, the EC declared that other 
member states might be referred to the Court of Justice.332  As a result, national 
governments have forced monopolistic energy companies—including those Gazprom 
partially owns—to divest assets and unbundle pipeline ownership in compliance with the 
Third Energy Package.333  Still, pipeline unbundling is not the most significant obstacle 
to bridging the east/west gas divide.  
Eastern European states could diversify energy supplies—increasing EU energy 
security—if the EU improved regulations to render cross-border shipping faster and 
easier. Lack of coordination among member states and the preponderance of Transport 
System Operators (TSOs) make cross-border gas flows inefficient. For example, a gas 
supplier must ensure that the transport capacities requests submitted to several TSOs 
(often one per member state) match along the entire transport route. This coordination is 
difficult because member states and TSOs have different compliance rules and varying 
systems to allocate pipeline capacity and manage gas flows.334  Consequently, Eastern 
European states are unlikely to reap the benefits of increased LNG development in 
Western Europe under the current cross-border framework. Yet, the EC’s enforcement of 
unbundling pipeline ownership could positively impact cross-border trade. Many vertical 
gas monopolies, forced to divest national pipeline infrastructure ownership, have begun 
consolidating holdings across borders. These horizontal acquisitions may actually bolster 
cross-border harmonization as large companies will to seek streamline gas shipments to 
increase profits.335  Removing barriers to cross-border gas trade, possibly through the 
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implementation of an EU energy passport and European-level oversight, could enable a 
small, independence energy firm to import LNG in Western Europe in order to sell this 
gas in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, internal policies will deliver the greatest boon to 
EU energy security, which will also on influence foreign energy relations. Oettering 
assert, “The completion of the internal market and a strong external voice are two sides of 
the same coin.”336  The internal market will allow the EU to leverage LNG and minor 
shale developments to strengthen its poison vis-à-vis unreliable and aggressive energy 
providers. 
2. External Relations 
The Eurasian Energy Bridge has been rife with insecurity. Moscow has used gas 
disruptions and price disputes or threatened to impose these sanctions over forty times 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union—reflecting the Kremlin’s willingness to use its 
hydrocarbon assets for political blackmail. Russia’s actions illustrate that Moscow 
believes customer governments will not challenge Russia’s aggressive energy 
diplomacy.337  Moscow’s resolve to be the “key center” of the energy flow to Europe is 
also resilient as evidenced in President Putin’s decree to block the EC’s anti-trust 
investigation of Gazprom. Yet, unconventional natural gas has bolstered EU geopolitical 
clout—concerning energy relations—because LNG addresses the fundamental principles 
of energy security: diversification of supply, system buffers to serve against supply 
shocks, and recognition of “the reality of integration.”338   
EU customers have several alternatives to Russian gas through LNG shipments. 
In 2012, Europe’s LNG imports primarily originated in Qatar, Algeria, and Nigeria. In 
the future, the EU’s most likely LNG providers will be Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, and possibly Iran. In order to prevent an LNG monopoly 
or cartel, Richard Anderson—a Senior Fellow in the George C. Marshall Center’s 
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College of International and Security Studies—suggests balancing upstream investments 
so that no particular supplier acquires more than 20 percent of the EU LNG import 
market.339  Brussels’ near-realization of an integrated market enables LNG to serve as a 
system buffer as well through redirecting LNG shipments to areas most affected by 
supply disruptions or providing natural gas from storage facilities via the interconnector 
network. Despite the hurdles to constructing a unified energy market, facing “the reality 
of integration” in the globalizing gas market may be the EU’s most precarious energy 
security endeavor. 
As the natural gas market globalizes through unconventional innovations, 
Yergin’s “reality of integration” principle assets energy security will depend greatly on 
foreign relations. Oettinger echoes Yergin’s principle: “To exploit the EU’s geopolitical 
potential, we must reinforce our cooperation with strategic partners…with the objective 
of promotion regulatory convergence.”340  Despite Russia’s unreliable history, it will 
remain the largest gas exporter in the world and Gazprom will likely provide significant 
supplies to Europe’s natural gas market. Therefore, energy security vis-à-vis Russia 
should be approached with a dual approach: integrating Russia into the European market 
to decrease its ability to leverage energy blackmail, while diversifying energy sources to 
ensure that integration with Gazprom does not heighten energy dependence.   
Furthermore, diversification may compel Moscow to integrate in a mutually reinforcing 
feedback loop. The EC’s September 4, 2012 antitrust probe against Gazprom showed the 
Kremlin that if Russia does not conform, it will lose significant market share, especially 
in Eastern Europe—where the Kremlin is keen to exercise influence. Moreover, the EC 
will probably fine Gazprom billions of Euros and deem oil-linked prices, long-term 
contracts, take-or-pay clauses, and prohibitions against reselling gas anti-competitive.341 
Consequently, Gazprom’s business model will require significant changes. Enforcing the 
Third Energy Package regulations will also make it difficult for Russia to employ 
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bilateral energy relations. Furthermore, the anti-trust investigation is a message from 
Brussels to member states that Gazprom is no longer treated as a special case.342   
The European Union should also seek to incorporate Ukraine, Belarus, and other 
non-EU FSU states into compliance with the EU’s market rules. This integration may 
foster cooperation between EU, Russia, and Ukraine for infrastructure upgrades that can 
provide inexpensive pipeline gas through networks owned by independent energy 
firms—decreasing Russian control and Ukraine’s reliance on state-owned companies as 
well. This model could be employed in Belarus as well. Integrating Russian and non-EU 
firms companies into Europe’s gas market may provide inexpensive pipeline gas, in 
competition with LNG sources, and foster economic interchanges with Russia. As Russia 
sells its gas in the European market, it is likely to purchase high-tech and industrial goods 
in return. Maintaining economic interdependence may not only reduce the threat of overt 
military conflict, but also transmits European value and the benefit of market economies 
to Russian leaders and citizens as well. European values could also reemerge ate the 
forefront of EU engagement in the Caspian. 
Most European governments have viewed the Caspian region as a key to EU 
energy security. Yet, Russian and Chinese engagement has hindered Brussels’s role in the 
region. Even high-level EU engagement did not secure natural gas from Turkmenistan or 
forward development on trans-Caspian energy ties.343  However, unconventional gas 
developments have the potential to eliminate Europe’s need for Caspian gas and diffuse 
zero sum energy competition in the region. Consequently, the EU could remain a 
marginal influence in the Caspian Region, especially Central Asia.344  Some analysts 
believe western governments and firms should model its energy relations after China’s 
use of energy backed loans and limited political involvement.345  Yet, Russia’s lack of 
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will and ability to support Central Asian leaders and China’s non-intervention stance 
provides Europe an opportunity to reopen dialogues with Central Asian leaders that focus 
on long-term strategies and development instead of short-term EU policy goals. 
Brussels’s efforts to obtain Caspian hydrocarbons have often prevented the development 
of consistent policies towards growth and stability in the region, but shifting Eurasian 
energy dynamics may facilitate European engagement in the Caspian Region by 
addresses emergent requirements and challenges in the region such as rule of law, human 
rights, election monitoring, defense-level mentoring, and policing support. The EU’s 
Common Security and Defense Policy’s capabilities are uniquely structured to support 
EU missions to this region—in contrast with NATO and CSTO military-centric 
capabilities.346  Concerning energy relations, the European Union still has the 
opportunity to assist Caspian hydrocarbon producers in upstream investment and 
technological development. Western investment goals in this region should focus on 
providing technical assistance and fostering competitive market dynamics in the energy 
sector—even if western energy security is not directly affected. Moreover, the EU could 
leverage its role as a disinterested party—not requiring Caspian energy—to promote 
transparency, common market rules, and rule of law to provide a stable investment 
environment. These actions may not deliver Caspian energy to European markets, but can 
communicate to Caspian leaders that Brussels is focused on long-term development 
instead of extractive geopolitics.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Unconventional natural gas developments may bolster EU energy security by 
providing energy diversity, the ability to respond to supply shocks, but most importantly 
a key incentive for EU member states to implement a unified energy market. Beyond the 
EU’s benefit, LNG and shale gas pose second and third order implications for 
European/Eurasian energy relations. Russia has maneuvered to maintain its position as 
the “key center” in Eurasian energy relations, but LNG has transformed traditional 
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natural gas flows. Still, hydrocarbon exports are critical to Russian economic and 
political stability. In light of Russia’s waning energy influence and decreased natural gas 
profits, internal reforms to Russia’s energy sector are necessary and there are signs that 
Russia can reform. Despite Vladimir Putin’s endeavor to control the hydrocarbon 
industry, managers and investors within the energy sector have pushed for internal 
reforms to liberalize the energy industry and enable Russian companies to become more 
competitive in the world energy market to increase profits. 
The Kremlin’s ability to shield energy companies from foreign market rules has 
also been reduced by LNG developments in Europe and Brussels’s efforts to unify the 
energy market. Russia’s decreased foreign influence is another indicator of potential 
reform. LNG developments have enabled price arbitrage in Europe that has shown 
Gazprom as a pricey and unreliable energy provider. Moreover, Gazprom’s future share 
of the European energy market is likely to diminish as LNG imports increase and 
renewable energies become a larger part of the EU’s energy mix. Yet, Russia still has few 
alternative customers because infrastructure to Asia has not been developed to support a 
large-scale export shift. Consequently, Putin’s decree that Gazprom will not cooperate 
with the EU’s anti-trust case appears empty as Gazprom has already begun unbundling 
energy assets to comply with the EU’s Third Energy Package. Although it appears that 
Russia is truly the dependent party, Moscow can play an important role in Eurasian 
energy security.    Russia possesses the world’s largest gas fields and will likely remain 
the world’s biggest natural gas exporter. Gazprom can provide significant quantities of 
gas to Europe, if it is priced competitively and in compliance with EU market rules. 
Therefore, EU energy security strategy should utilize a dual-pronged approach: 
integrating Russia into the European market and diversifying sources away from Russia 
through unconventional natural gas investment. Ensuring Russian firms comply with EU 
regulations will likely decrease the incidents of future energy dependence, foster 
economic interdependence between the EU and Russia, and may decrease future energy 
blackmail attempts as a tool of desperation to gain political attention or market share. 
LNG development and decreased European demand have limited the EU’s and 
Russia’s need for Caspian natural gas, which has diminished resource competition in the 
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region. Moscow’s reduced need for Central Asian energy may result in less regional 
influence; conversely, China continues to offset Russia’s political power with economic 
integration.    China will likely remain the key energy player in the region. Moreover, 
increasing Chinese natural gas demand may bring Russia and China together; however, 
Russian exports to China and North East Asia may not yield the political clout that 
Moscow has traditionally yield in the FSU. Thus, the impact of North East Asian energy 
demand on Eurasian energy relations warrants future investigation.   Russia’s waning 
impact and China’s non-interventionist approach will directly impact Central Asian 
domestic politics. Central Asian leaders may be unsure of political support from Russia, 
China, or Europe when confronting internal threats or shifting domestic dynamics in the 
regions. Because the EU will likely no longer need Caspian energy to bolster energy 
security, Brussels can engage these FSU leaders to address emergent challenges such as 
rule of law, human rights, monitoring, and policing. Simply restated, the EU has a unique 
opportunity to transmit its values through soft power engagement tools instead of seeking 















Unconventional natural gas innovations, such as shale gas and Liquefied Natural 
Gas, have dynamically altered energy security relationships between Russia, the former 
Soviet republics, and Europe. Although the Kremlin has shown that it will use energy as 
a form of political coercion, LNG has diminishing Russia’s market share of European 
energy imports and its ability to disrupt domestic markets—thereby blunting Moscow’s 
energy blackmail attacks. Moreover, unconventional natural gas has fortified European 
energy security where traditional pipeline projects have failed to diversify natural gas 
resources. 
Europe’s reliance on natural gas pipelines raises critical energy security concerns. 
Most significantly, Russia’s dominating stake as an energy supplier allows Moscow the 
potential leverage to influence individual countries. This power is evident in Russia’s 
attempt to sway the unbundling and compliance activities of Lithuania and Moldova by 
raising natural gas prices. Consequently, the EU has attempted to counter its energy 
insecurity vis-à-vis Moscow by seeking alternative energy suppliers—a central pillar of 
energy security. Yet, the EU’s attempt to expand energy resources through new pipeline 
construction to Central Asia via the Nabucco project has proved unsuccessful because 
Russia has stymied EU development of the Southern gas corridor. The EU’s Nabucco 
project and Russia’s South Stream compete for customers, transit states, investors, and 
natural gas sources. Furthermore, Nabucco faces considerable hurdles; most importantly, 
lack of gas sources to render the pipeline feasible for economic investment. South Stream 
is scheduled to begin construction of the most difficult and expensive section—the Black 
Sea pipeline—in early 2013. Moreover, South Stream is likely to provide 30 bcm/year by 
2017—before Nabucco begins producing 6 bcm/year—rendering the EU’s project 
irrelevant. Thus, a trans-Caspian pipeline appears unlikely, and the EU’s strategy of 
building pipelines to bypass Russia or Iran is not likely to reduce susceptibility to energy 
disruptions.  
Shale gas and LNG have fostered a global gas market that has begun transforming 
the patterns of energy dependency. States with shorelines or shale gas deposits may no 
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longer be reliant on their neighbors for transit of energy or a regional gas exporters for 
supplies. In the last ten years, the United States’ shale gas development has produced a 
global surplus of natural gas, decreased gas prices, and diverted LNG supplies to Europe. 
The impact of shale and LNG has led some to wonder if Europe can emulate America’s 
shale gas boom to become energy independent. Due to the environmental, technological 
and economic, and regulatory/public acceptance challenges to full-scale shale gas 
extraction, a European shale gas boom is unlikely. Nevertheless, some EU member states 
are poised to begin shale extraction, such as the United Kingdom and Poland. 
Consequently, shale gas will likely serve as a buffer energy source, but not a pillar of 
energy independence. Conversely, LNG has already altered the market dynamics that 
govern European natural gas sales. 
Increased LNG imports have created competition between Europe’s gas 
suppliers—resulting in lower prices. Pipeline gas competition with LNG sources has 
enabled price arbitrage in Europe and compelled Russia to sell a portion of its natural gas 
at LNG spot prices. Moreover, Gazprom is viewed as a costly and undependable energy 
provider. Gazprom’s future share of the European energy market will likely diminish as 
LNG imports increase.   As EU natural gas consumption increases, energy will likely be 
required from incrementally remote locations—necessitating long-distance pipelines.   As 
pipeline lengths increase—raising costs—LNG will become an equally economical 
energy source. Consequently, energy providers that feed long-distance pipelines may 
have to accept spot pricing as the “new normal” to compete with LNG in the global gas 
marketplace. Still, the most significant impact of LNG imports to Europe is that old 
patterns of energy dependence are weakened. As European states build LNG terminals, 
Russia’s dominance over energy exports will continue to diminish.  
Liquefied Natural Gas has the potential to further revolutionize European-
Eurasian energy security dynamics. LNG’s role in European energy security can be seen 
in Greece’s ability to provide natural gas to itself and in Bulgaria during the 2009 Russo-
Ukrainian energy dispute using increased LNG imports. As the EU continues to build 
LNG import terminals, access to global gas sources will increase—providing a significant 
alternative to Russian pipeline gas. By 2016, the EU will expand three existing facilities 
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and complete construction of six new terminals to augment the twenty-one existing LNG 
import sites. Furthermore, eleven terminals are scheduled for future expansion and 
twenty-eight new LNG import sites are planned for future development. Consequently, 
European LNG import capacity could reach 417 bcm/year or seventy-five percent of the 
EU’s natural gas imports. Yet, the location of Europe’s LNG terminals is cause for 
concern. Poland is the only former Warsaw Pact or FSU state that is currently 
constructing an LNG terminal. Although Eastern Europe may appear vulnerable to 
Russia’s fickle energy policies, LNG terminals in Western Europe can still strengthen 
Eastern European energy security if the EU develops policies and physical infrastructure 
to support the internal European market.    
Unconventional natural gas developments may not only bolster EU energy 
security by providing energy diversity and the ability to respond to supply shocks, but 
also provide a key incentive for EU member states to implement a unified energy market. 
The probable maturity of a unified market is evident in the myriad interconnector 
pipelines projects currently under construction in the Baltic region and Central and 
Eastern Europe. Additionally, the EC’s resolve to bring violators under EC rules displays 
political will to complete the internal energy market. The EC’s September 4, 2012 
antitrust probe against Gazprom and October 24, 2012 referral of Slovenia and Poland to 
the EU Court of Justice for noncompliance with the Third Energy Package are 
compelling examples of Brussels’ desire to unify the EU energy market al.though, 
Moscow’s objection to transparency and adhering to EU regulations appears stalwart, 
LNG provides Europe with gas import alternatives. Conversely, Russia still has few 
alternative customers because infrastructure to Asia has not been developed to support a 
large-scale export shift.   
The Kremlin’s ability to shield energy companies from foreign market rules has 
been reduced by LNG developments in Europe and Brussels’ efforts to unify the energy 
market. Hydrocarbon exports are critical to Russian economic and political stability. In 
light of Russia’s waning energy influence and decreased natural gas profits, internal 
reforms to Russia’s energy sector are necessary and there are signs that Russia can 
reform. Despite Vladimir Putin’s actions to control the hydrocarbon industry, managers 
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and investors within the energy sector have pushed for internal reforms to liberalize the 
energy industry and enable Russian companies to become more competitive in the global 
energy market to increase profits. Consequently, Putin’s September 11, 2012 decree that 
Gazprom will not cooperate with the EC’s anti-trust investigation appears empty because 
Gazprom has already begun unbundling energy assets to comply with the EU’s Third 
Energy Package. Unconventional natural gas innovations pose second and third order 
implications for European/Eurasian energy dynamics beyond EU-Russian relations.  
Shale gas and LNG have impacted Eurasian domestic and foreign policies. Russia 
has maneuvered to maintain its position as “key center” of the Eurasian energy bridge, 
but LNG has transformed traditional natural gas flows. The EU will require less gas from 
Russia and Central Asia, but cancelling the Nabucco project does not abandon Central 
Asia to Russian primacy. Moscow’s decreased necessity for Central Asian energy may 
result in less regional influence; conversely, Beijing continues to offset the Kremlin’s 
political power with economic integration and increased resource extraction. Russia’s 
waning impact and China’s non-interventionist approach will directly impact Central 
Asian domestic politics. Central Asian leaders may be unsure of political support from 
Russia, China, or Europe when confronting internal threats or shifting domestic dynamics 
in the region. Because the EU will likely no longer need Caspian energy to bolster energy 
security, Brussels has a unique opportunity to transmit its values through soft power 
engagement tools instead of seeking to build ties with Caspian leaders to secure 
hydrocarbon assets.   
China will remain a key energy player in Eurasia. While Beijing’s natural gas 
demand may deepen Chinese and Russian economic relations, natural gas exports to 
China and North East Asia may not yield Moscow the political clout that it has 
traditionally held in the FSU. Additionally, several factors may hamper Sino-Russian 
energy relations. First, decreased EU gas imports from Gazprom may render Russia 
dependent on China to buy its gas, which will give Beijing a strong negotiating position. 
Moscow may limit its sales to Beijing to reduce its risk of export dependence. Second, 
Russia and China may not overcome their current strained relations, especially in light of 
the Kremlin’s concern over China’s growing influence in Central Asia and Russia’s Far 
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East. Third, China is poised to play a significant role in the global gas market. While 
traditionally viewed as a hydrocarbon consumer, China may possess greater shale gas 
resources than the United States. Moreover, Beijing has demonstrated political will to 
exploit these deposits. In March 2012, China’s National Energy Agency forecasted its 
shale gas sector would produce 6.5 bcm/year by 2015 and 60 -100 bcm/year of shale gas 
by 2020.347 Thus, the future of Sino-Russian energy relations and its impact on Eurasian 
energy networks merit further analysis.     
Although it appears that unconventional gas innovations are propelling Russia 
towards dependence on its customers, Moscow can play an important role in Eurasian 
energy security. Russia possesses the world’s largest conventional gas reserves and will 
likely remain the world’s leading natural gas exporter. Gazprom can provide significant 
quantities of gas to Europe, if it is priced competitively and in compliance with EU 
market rules. Therefore, EU energy security strategy should avoid alienating Russia by 
employing a dual-pronged approach: integrating Russia into the European market and 
diversifying sources away from Russia through Shale gas and LNG investment. Ensuring 
Russian firms comply with EU regulations will likely decrease the likelihood of future 
energy dependence, foster economic interdependence between the EU and Russia, and 
may decrease future energy blackmail attempts as a tool of desperation to gain political 
attention or market share. The terrorist attack on the natural gas facility in Amenas, 
Algeria on January 16, 2013, illustrates how unforeseen shocks can disrupt global gas 
supplies. Thus, Russian gas can serve as a buffer during times of energy crises in Africa, 
the Middle East, or beyond. Despite the EU’s decreased vulnerability to energy 
disruptions via unconventional natural gas innovations, the Eurasian energy bridge is still 
necessary. The EU will likely continue to require Russian gas and Russia will likely rely 
on Central Asian energy to support its domestic market. No single party is currently 
situated to dominate Eurasian energy flows or achieve energy independence. Therefore, 
the Kremlin’s desire to play “key center” of the gas corridors to Europe appears to be a 
bridge too far in Eurasian energy relations.  
                                                 
347 Natali, “The U.S. Natural Gas Revolution,” 28; Stevens, “The ‘Shale Gas Revolution,’” 8; “The 
Journal Report: Energy,” Wall Street Journal. 
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